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DUE PROCESS LIMITATIONS ON RULE 23(B)(2) MONETARY
REMEDIES: EXAMINING THE SOURCE OF THE LIMITATION IN
WAL-MART STORES, INC. V. DUKES
Megan E. Barriger∗
INTRODUCTION
The Wal-Mart v. Dukes decision prompted a storm of media atten1
tion, with some predicting the end of large-scale class actions. On
the one-year anniversary of the Dukes decision, legislation was pro2
posed to reverse the “damage” done by the Dukes decision. The decision is still very much in the public’s mind, and it is viewed as having
damaged workers’ ability to hold employers accountable for discriminatory employment policies.
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See Kimberly Atkins, The new class of 2011: U.S. Supreme Court defeats didn’t end class actions,
but
they
did
change
them,
LAWYERS USA ONLINE
(July
26,
2011),
http://lawyersusaonline.com/blog/2011/07/26/the-new-class-of-2011/
(articulating
Professor Malveaux’s belief that “[t]he class action ‘is not dead, but it certainly was injured by the Court this year’”); see also Katherine Kimpel, Wal-Mart ruling disarms employees
in David vs. Goliath cases, DAILY BUSINESS REV., July 18, 2011 (observing that with the WalMart v. Dukes decision, “the Supreme Court . . . effectively disarmed employees, taking
back the class action slingshot by inventing a new, virtually impossible standard for class
certification” and that “[t]he perverse result of this new standard is that the larger the
corporation gets, the harder it will be for an employee to succeed”); Piper Hoffman,
Court to women:
You’re on your own, NEWSDAY, June 22, 2011, available at
http://www.newsday.com/opinion/oped/hoffman-court-to-women-you-re-on-your-own1.2977422 (describing the Wal-Mart v. Dukes decision as “a major loss for women, minorities, senior citizens, the disabled and any other group that tends to get the short end of
the stick in the workplace”).
Press Release, The Lawyer’s Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, House and Senate Introduce Legislation to Restore Workers’ Rights, Reverse Damage Resulting From WalMart Supreme Court Decision (June 20, 2012), available at www.lawyerscommittee.org/pr
ojects/employment_discrimination/press_releases?id=0241.
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Justice Scalia began the Dukes decision by observing that it was
3
“one of the most expansive class actions ever.” Dukes held that the
certification of a class of female employees of Wal-Mart was incon4
sistent with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(2).
The class action involved claims of sex discrimination in violation of
Title VII. The one and a half million current and former female employees of Wal-Mart sought injunctive relief and declaratory relief to
prevent Wal-Mart from continuing its allegedly discriminatory pay
5
and promotion practices. The plaintiff class also sought monetary
damages in the form of a backpay award of lost wages and earnings
6
due to Wal-Mart’s alleged discrimination.
In the portion of the decision most frequently discussed, Dukes
provided clarification on the commonality requirement in Rule
23(a)(2) and made it harder for a potential class to meet the re7
quirements. Dukes also provided commentary on the question of
whether claims for monetary relief can be included with claims for
injunctive relief. Despite having a history of considering this ques8
tion but not fully resolving it, the Supreme Court yet again skirted
the question. The growing circuit split on this particular issue—
whether claims for monetary relief are ever consistent with certification under Rule 23(b)(2)—had presented a perfect opportunity for
resolution. Instead of resolving the issue, the Supreme Court, in dicta, simply raised serious doubt that there were any forms of incidental
monetary relief that could be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) without
9
violating the Due Process Clause.
If true, this possibility would create an enormous roadblock to Title VII employment discrimination claims, which have historically
been brought under Rule 23(b)(2) and have also included awards for
backpay. To better understand the implications for class actions going forward, it is helpful to first examine why the Supreme Court limited—and potentially removed altogether—the possibility of class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) when monetary damages are also in3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011).
Id. at 2556–57.
Id. at 2547.
Id.
Id. at 2556–57.
See infra Parts I.C. and II.B.
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2559 (“In the context of a class action predominantly for money damages we have held that absence of notice and opt-out violates due process. . . . While we
have never held that to be so where the monetary claims do not predominate, the serious
possibility that it may be so provides an additional reason not to read Rule 23(b)(2) to include the monetary claims here.” (internal citation omitted)).
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involved. Was it simply the sheer size of this particular class, or was
there something more?
This Comment examines the Dukes decision through the lens of
due process. Based on the history of Rule 23 and the way in which
the Supreme Court has interpreted the requirements of due process
in the context of class actions, there is a lack of due process protection for the absent class members in Rule 23(b)(2) when those actions involve monetary damages. Part I takes up these issues. In light
of the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the history of Rule 23 and its
structure, the limitations on monetary remedies in Rule 23(b)(2)
classes can—and should—be understood as being driven by underlying due process concerns. The Supreme Court’s lack of a blanket
prohibition on all monetary relief from Rule 23(b)(2) class actions is
consistent with the 1966 Civil Rules Advisory Committee’s implied
understanding of courts’ ability to determine due process requirements on a case-by-case basis for Rule 23(b)(2) classes. This analysis
is presented in Part II.
Finally, what are the implications of due process concerns driving
the limitation on monetary remedies in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions?
How should these due process concerns be accounted for in employment discrimination class actions? What impact does Dukes have
on the other routes to resolving these types of aggregate disputes?
Part III begins this assessment by presenting the approach taken by
the Dukes plaintiffs in the subsequent litigation as a case study. Next,
two alternative approaches that address the due process concerns are
briefly explored with the aim of beginning the discussion on how to
accommodate the due process concerns underlying Dukes’ limitation
on monetary remedies in Rule 23(b)(2) actions.
I. CLASS ACTIONS AND DUE PROCESS
Parties may not be bound to a judgment in which they were not a
10
party. Class actions, however, are one of the few exceptions to this
11
general rule. While this exception is fundamentally in tension with
the general requirements of due process, class actions are nonethe-

10

11

See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) (“It is a principle of general application in
Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party
by service of process.”).
Id. at 41 (“To these general rules there is a recognized exception that . . . the judgment in
a ‘class’ or ‘representative’ suit, to which some members of the class are parties, may bind
members of the class or those represented who were not made parties to it.”).
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less an important part of the American litigation system. Class actions are crucial to vindicating rights that would not otherwise be
vindicated, for example, in discrimination cases where the primary
relief sought is to prevent the entity from continuing to discriminate.
Because class actions may bind parties who are not even aware of
the litigation, class actions raise a host of potential issues related to
the Due Process Clause. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23,
which governs class actions, requires only that absent class members
12
be adequately represented. The Supreme Court has affirmed that
this is the only protection required by the Due Process Clause in class
13
actions seeking primarily injunctive relief. When a class seeks both
equitable and monetary relief, as is frequently the case in employment discrimination cases, Rule 23 as it currently exists and is applied
by the Supreme Court, may not adequately protect the due process
14
rights of absent class members. The due process analysis is further
complicated by the preclusive effect of the class judgment on the ab15
sent class members. When taking into account the history of Rule
23, judicial concerns, and the interaction of preclusion doctrine with
Rule 23, there may be a lack of due process protection for absent
class members in classes seeking certification under Rule 23(b)(2)
when the class also includes claims for monetary relief. Title VII employment discrimination cases are a common example of this type of
class action.
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and Rule 23(b)(2) Classes
16

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs class actions. Class
actions allow plaintiffs to pool claims that would otherwise not be litigated due to their small size or where joinder of all interested parties
17
would be impractical. A proposed class must satisfy the four prerequisites in Rule 23(a): numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
18
adequacy.
12
13
14
15
16
17

18

!

See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part I.C.
See infra Part I.D.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (“Modern plaintiff
class actions . . . permit[] litigation of a suit involving common questions when there are
too many plaintiffs for proper joinder” and may also permit “the plaintiffs to pool claims
which would be uneconomical to litigate individually.”).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (defining the four prerequisites: “numerosity” requires that the class
be sufficiently large as to make joinder impractical; “commonality” requires that the
named parties and absent class members share at least one common issue of law or fact;
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The proposed class must next satisfy the requirements of one of
19
the three subdivisions of 23(b). Rule 23(b)(1) encompasses class
actions where multiple actions would risk either inconsistent outcomes or would “substantially impair” other class members’ ability to
20
protect their interests. Rule 23(b)(2), the focus of this Comment,
requires that the relief sought be primarily injunctive and be applica21
ble to the class as a whole. Finally, Rule 23(b)(3), which is the most
inclusive of the three types of classes, requires that there be common
“questions of law or fact” that predominate over individual issues and
that class adjudication be “superior to other available methods” of ad22
judicating the controversy.
A classic example of a Rule 23(b)(2) class is a civil rights case,
where the class is suing to prevent an entity or person from continu23
ing its discriminatory policies. Historically, Title VII employment
discrimination cases have used Rule 23(b)(2) to bring employment
discrimination actions. Title VII cases “typically involve[] allegations
that [an] employer [has] engaged in a pattern and practice of inten24
tional discrimination” and are often handled in two phases. In the
first, the liability phase, the employer’s liability as to its allegedly discriminatory employment practices is determined, and injunctive relief is granted if discriminatory practices are found; in the second, the
remedial phase, remedies for individual members of the class are de-

19
20

21

22
23

24

“typicality” requires that the claims of the named parties are typical of those of the absent
class members; and “adequacy” requires that the named parties adequately represent the
interests of the absent class members).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
A class action may be certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) if separate actions risk generating
inconsistent outcomes in the individual actions, which would potentially hold the defendant to incompatible standards of conduct. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A). A class action
may be certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) if individual adjudication by one member of the
class would “substantially impair” the ability of the other class members to protect their
interests. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) (requiring that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused
to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole”).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes (1966) (explaining that Rule 23(b)(2) “does
not extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money damages”). The advisory committee notes also observe that the civilrights field is an illustrative example of a Rule 23(b)(2) class, but notes that Rule
“[23](b)(2) is not limited to civil-rights cases.” Id.
Daniel F. Piar, The Uncertain Future of Title VII Class Actions After the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
2001 BYU L. REV. 305, 312 (2001). My description of Title VII oversimplifies the reality.
For a more detailed discussion of Title VII and the impact of the 1991 Civil Rights Act,
which changed the type of remedies available to plaintiffs, thereby creating complications
with certifying Title VII cases under Rule 23(b)(2), see generally id. at 312–15.
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25

termined–often monetary damages such as backpay. Courts have
allowed the inclusion of backpay awards because they have been
viewed as flowing from the alleged discrimination itself, thus making
26
it difficult to disentangle from the injunctive relief sought.
The
plaintiffs in Dukes similarly sought an injunction to stop Wal-Mart’s
alleged discriminatory pay and promotion practices, along with back27
pay damages.
The first two classes of subdivision 23(b), 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2),
are distinguishable from the third, 23(b)(3), in terms of the right to
and ability of absent class members to remove themselves from the
28
litigation. For this reason, the first two classes are commonly referred to as the mandatory classes. Absent class members in Rule
23(b)(3) classes have the right to opt out of the litigation and also
29
must be given notice of the pending class action. This distinction
between the mandatory classes and Rule 23(b)(3) classes is made on
the basis of “class cohesiveness,” which theoretically makes representation by named plaintiffs more likely to be adequate in the mandato30
ry classes. Further, the lack of opt-out rights for absent class members in the mandatory classes has been rationalized on the basis of
these injuries being “group interest injuries,” meaning that, given the
25
26

27
28

29

30

See Piar, supra note 24, at 312–13.
See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.04 illus. 5 (2010)
(discussing divisible and indivisible remedies in the context of preclusion doctrine and
explaining that courts “should consider whether aggregate treatment of any common issues concerning Defendant’s liability will determine, in practical effect, the availability
and method for the distribution of back pay,” because if it does, the claims for backpay
should be treated on an aggregate basis); Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Damages and Other Remedies In Employment Cases, in AM. LAW INST. & AM. BAR ASS’N, DAMAGES IN EMPLOYMENT
CASES 271, 290 (2008) (“Prevailing parties . . . are entitled to back wages in the amounts
they would have earned but for the . . . discrimination.”). For further discussion, see infra
note 118.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A); see also Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions,
Litigant Autonomy, and the Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1588
(2007) (explaining that in (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), or (b)(2) classes, participation in the
class is “mandatory,” whereas in a (b)(3) class, members have the option to opt out of the
proceeding).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (“[T]he court must direct to class members the best notice
that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members
who can be identified through reasonable effort.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v) (stating
“that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion”).
See Holmes v. Cont’l Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1155 n.8 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Although the
interests of the different members of a (b)(2) class are by no means identical the substantial cohesion of those interests makes it likely that representative members can adequately
represent the interests of absent members . . . .” (quoting Comment, Notice in Rule
23(b)(2) Class Actions for Monetary Relief: Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 128 U. PA. L.
REV. 1236, 1253–54 (1980))).

Nov. 2012]

DUE PROCESS LIMITATIONS AND RULE 23(b)(2)

625

nature of the claim, the defendant must necessarily treat all class
31
members the same. In contrast, Rule 23(b)(3) classes involve individualized monetary relief, which makes the class less homogenous
32
and introduces conflict of interest problems within the class. With
individualized monetary relief, opt-out rights are necessary to protect
the minimum due process rights of the absent class members, in this
case, the right to pursue their claim for monetary damages individu33
ally.
Rule 23 incorporates specific provisions to address due process
concerns. All three types of classes are protected by the adequacy re34
quirement in subdivision 23(a). Rule 23(b)(3) classes, as discussed
35
above, have notice and opt-out rights. In addition, Rule 23 grants
courts the discretion to direct that notice be given to absent class
36
members in the mandatory classes. Absent class members in the
mandatory classes are afforded additional due process protection
when a class settlement is proposed: all proposed settlements must
be approved by the court and notice must be given to all affected
37
class members.
Thus, adequate representation is the only requirement in the text
of Rule 23 itself that helps ensure absent class members’ due process
rights in the mandatory classes. Adequate representation requires
only that the representative plaintiffs “fairly and adequately protect
38
the interests of the [whole] class” and that class counsel “fairly and
39
adequately represent[s] the interests of the class.” There is no requirement in the text of Rule 23 that an absent class member be
31
32
33
34
35

36
37

38
39

See Rima N. Daniels, Monetary Damages in Mandatory Classes: When Should Opt-Out Rights Be
Allowed?, 57 ALA. L. REV. 499, 504 (2005).
See id. at 504–05.
See id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (stating that “the representative parties [must] fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class”).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (“For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must
direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v) (stating that notice to (b)(3) classes must clearly
explain “that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion”).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (“For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), the
court may direct appropriate notice to the class.”).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1) (requiring, for all proposed settlements, that the court “direct
notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by the proposal”); see also Mark C. Weber, Preclusion and Procedural Due Process in Rule 23(b)(2) Class
Actions, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 347, 388 (1988) (discussing Federal Rule 23 and the
protections afforded absent class members).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4).

626

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15:2

aware of the litigation; because of this, adequate representation is a
weak form of protection. Representative plaintiffs and class counsel
have incentives to try to certify a proposed class action under Rule
23(b)(2) to avoid the additional requirements imposed by Rule
23(b)(3). However, when the relief sought in the proposed Rule
23(b)(2) class action includes monetary damages in addition to the
injunctive relief, absent class members with a legitimate monetary
damage claim may be bound to an adverse outcome in the class action—an action about which the absent class member may not have
known and from which the absent class member could not have opted out.
B. Due Process Protection for Absent Class Members
Class actions are an exception to the general rule that an in personam judgment is not binding on a person when he was not desig40
nated as a party or was not served with process. In contrast to the
general rule, a class action is binding on the absent parties, even
41
when the absent parties were unaware of the action. For this reason,
Rule 23 strictly imposes conditions on when a class may be certified.
Courts must rigorously assess whether Rule 23’s requirements are met
to ensure that the due process rights of absent class members are pro42
tected.
In the academic discourse, there is consensus that due process re43
quires adequate representation at minimum.
Indeed, this is re40
41

42
43

!

Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3). See generally Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34, 35–36 (2011)
(“The [absent] class members are bound by a court judgment they may not have known
about, much less consented to. This extraordinary situation is justified by the class’s homogeneity and cohesiveness.”); Weber, supra note 37, at 348 (“Together the [binding
judgment and notice] provisions cause individuals to be bound by res judicata by cases
they never knew existed. This situation seems patently unfair.”).
See Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160–61 (1982) (emphasizing the importance of
adhering to the prerequisites of Rule 23 in Title VII class actions).
See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, Just Go Away: Representation, Due Process, and Preclusion in Class
Actions, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1079, 1089–90 (2009) (observing that the Supreme Court
“equated adequate representation with due process as a prerequisite to a binding class
judgment” in Hansberry and that it insisted on adequate representation in Amchem and
Ortiz as well (citing Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc.
v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940))); Stephen J. Safranek, Do Class Action Plaintiffs Lose Their Constitutional Rights?, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 263, 282–
83 (1996) (observing that in Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., the Third Circuit found
that “adequacy of representation, not opt out rights or personal jurisdiction, was the
touchstone of due process” (citing Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.
1975))). For an argument that the Supreme Court’s doctrine has been paternalistic in
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44

quired by Rule 23. Adequate representation encompasses two parts:
(1) adequate representation by the named plaintiffs in the class ac45
tion; and (2) adequate representation by the class counsel. With regard to the first, the interests of the representative plaintiffs must be
aligned with those of the absent class members, meaning that there
should not be conflicts of interest within the class and that there
46
should be uniformity within the class. With regard to the second,
there is a distinction drawn between individual and aggregate litigation contexts. In the individual context, the plaintiff assumes the risk
47
of poor decisions regarding his representation or litigation strategy.
In contrast, with aggregate litigation such as a class action, there is
concern about having the absent class members assume all of this
risk. This concern is illustrated by the requirement in Rule 23 that
class counsel “fairly and adequately represent the interests of the
48
class.”
There is a distinction between the due process concerns raised by
actions seeking monetary relief and those seeking purely injunctive
relief. Generally, monetary damages are backward-looking in nature.
Monetary damages are sought to address wrongs that have already
happened and to compensate the individuals who were injured.

44
45
46

47

48

focusing solely on the adequacy of representation, see generally Redish & Larsen, supra
note 28, at 1616 (“Although both Rule 23 and Supreme Court doctrine seek to protect
the due process rights of absent class members, at no point [has anyone] recognized that
what has been implemented is purely a paternalistic form of due process—i.e., the concern
that those who represent the interests of the absent litigants enforce and protect those litigants’ rights enthusiastically and in good faith.”).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4).
Professor Wolff describes the often-overlooked problems with adequacy of representation
posed by class actions for the purposes of preclusion doctrine, which is nevertheless applicable to this discussion as well. Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 723 (2005) [hereinafter Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action
Litigation] (“Foremost among these [problems] are potential conflicts of interest. When
members of an otherwise cohesive class possess different configurations of factually related claims beyond those presented for class certification, the threat of claim and issue preclusion can give them starkly different incentives to prosecute or settle the action. Still
other preclusion problems can affect the entire class uniformly. Strategic litigation
choices—like a decision to eschew a federal cause of action in order to stay in state court,
or a failure to request a particular form of injunctive relief when seeking institutional reform—raise questions about the limits of the representational role in a class proceeding.”).
See id. at 721 (“Just as an individual litigant in a civil proceeding does not enjoy any right
of adequate representation that could enable him to escape the effects of a judgment,
and hence assumes the risk that his lawyers will make bad litigation choices on his behalf,
so a litigant assumes the risk that the judgment that results from a lawsuit may compromise other important interests that he possesses.”).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4).
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Consequently, monetary damages are more focused on individual re49
lief than an injunction, and theoretically are specifically attributable
to individuals rather than a collective group. As a result, there is a
sense that each individual class member has a right to a monetary
remedy for this injury. Due process is necessary to protect these individual rights to a monetary remedy.
In contrast, injunctions are forward-looking. They seek to prevent
injury that an actor, for example the defendant, is currently inflicting, such as discriminating on the basis of sex. In this way, an injunction is essentially about preventing a collective harm. Injunctive relief, therefore, seeks to prevent the defendant from harming
members of the class in the future. Because of this, it is more difficult
to argue that absent class members’ due process rights are not sufficiently protected in a Rule 23(b)(2) class seeking only injunctive re50
lief.
C. Concerns About the Adequacy of Due Process Protection for Absent Class
Members
There is disagreement in the academic discourse about which due
process protections provided to absent class members in Rule
23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) classes are sufficient. Some argue for a sliding
51
52
scale or balancing test approach to determine what due process
protection is required in a particular instance. Others argue that due
53
process may require an opt-in, rather than an opt-out, mechanism.
49
50

51

52

53

!

See infra note 225 (discussing the distinct issues raised by punitive damages).
However, there are arguments that this deprives absent class members of an important
right, the right of individual litigant autonomy. See generally MARTIN H. REDISH,
WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS
ACTION LAWSUIT 135–75 (2009).
See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the Nationwide
Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2076 (2008) (arguing that “Shutts requires a degree
of procedural due process in class proceedings that varies with the extent to which a
court proposes to place class members at risk of an alteration in their legal position” (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985))).
See Steven T.O. Cottreau, Note, The Due Process Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 73 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 480, 482, 510 (1998) (arguing that “two separate due process arguments support
the right to opt out: one related to adjudicatory jurisdiction and the other dealing with
basic procedural fairness,” and advocating the use of a balancing test “[t]o determine
whether due process requires opt out rights as a matter of procedural fairness”).
See Bassett, supra note 43, at 1115–16, 1118 (concluding that “the due process protections
accorded to unnamed class members are limited, and their attenuated nature creates a
striking contrast to the more vigilant protections provided in nonclass litigation” and recommending using an opt-in mechanism rather than an opt-out mechanism to address
this problem); Safranek, supra note 43, at 266 (arguing “that absent a unitary class interest, the Constitution arguably requires the use of an ‘opt in’ procedure to establish the
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Finally, one scholar argues that individuals have a right to individual
litigant autonomy, meaning both a right to fully control the litigation
54
and to decide whether to turn to litigation at all. Class actions, by
definition, strip absent class members of this right to individual litigant autonomy.
Looking back at the history of Rule 23’s amendments, the Civil
Rules Advisory Committee, which drafted Rule 23, did not seem particularly concerned about the due process rights of absent class
members in the mandatory classes, Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) clas55
ses. While unusual at first glance, this makes sense with what appears to be the Committee’s underlying assumption: the courts are
capable of determining the extent of due process required for absent
56
class members on a case-by-case basis. The Supreme Court’s decisions on the issue of what due process requires indicate the Court’s
own lack of certainty as to what the Due Process Clause requires for
57
absent class members in the mandatory classes.
1. Rule 23 Amendment History
58

In 1966, the class action rules were significantly revised. While
there were substantial revisions to Rule 23 after the 1966 amendments, none of them significantly affected the Rule’s treatment of
59
Rule 23(b)(2) classes.
The 1966 Rule Amendment Committee

54

55
56
57
58
59

!

plaintiff class” and that “[s]uch a requirement would clearly satisfy due process” and “ensure the liberty of those who do not want to be part of a lawsuit”).
See generally REDISH, supra note 50, at 135–75. In addition, others have argued that there
is a “right of access to the courts,” which is often specifically guaranteed in state constitutions. See Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, WalMart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 89 (2011) (noting that such
rights can be found, implicitly or explicitly, in forty state constitutions).
See infra Part I.C.1.
See infra Part I.C.1.
See infra Part I.C.2.
This was one of the biggest amendments to Rule 23 and these amendments set up the
current framework that still exists in Rule 23 today.
While the 2003 amendments did not substantially alter the Rule’s treatment of Rule
23(b)(2) classes, the 2003 Amendments did have an effect on Rule 23(b)(2) classes. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) advisory committee’s notes (2003) (discussing revision of Rule
23(c)(2) and calling attention “to the court’s authority—already established in part by
Rule 23(d)(2)—to direct notice of certification of a Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) class” and
making changes to the Rule’s notice provisions, settlement provisions, class counsel provisions, and attorney fee provisions); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) advisory committee’s notes
(2003) (noting Rule 23(e)’s amendment of class action settlement procedure for classes
certified under any of the subdivisions of Rule 23(b)). The 1998 Rule 23 amendments
significantly altered Rule 23, but did not change the Rule’s treatment of Rule 23(b)(2)
class actions. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes (1998) (amending rule 23
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notes and reports suggest that the Civil Rules Advisory Committee
was not terribly concerned about the due process rights of absent
class members in Rule 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) classes. The Committee Note to the 1966 Amendments to Rule 23 does not mention due
60
process anywhere within the description of subdivision 23(b). It is
61
only raised once—in the discussion of subdivision 23(d).
In the Report to the Standing Committee, the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee is almost cursory in its discussion of Rule 23(b)(2) and
focuses much more extensively on the details of and requirements for
62
Rule 23(b)(3) classes. The discussion of due process is similarly lim63
ited in the Committee’s Report. Even the acknowledged purpose of
the Rule 23 amendments is not particularly motivated by due process
64
concerns.
A contemporaneous article written by Professor Kaplan, the Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules at the time the 1966
amendments were drafted, captures the intentions of the Civil Rules

60
61
62

63

64

to provide for permissive interlocutory review of class certification orders). The 1987,
2007, and 2009 amendments to Rule 23 did not significantly alter Rule 23. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes (1987) (making technical amendments); FED. R.
CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes (2007) (updating as part of the general restyling of
the Federal Rules); FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes (2009) (revising rules
with ten-day time periods to fourteen-day time periods). For an additional discussion of
the Rule 23 amendment history, see Mark A. Perry & Rachel S. Brass, Rule 23(b)(2) Certification of Employment Class Actions: A Return to First Principles, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
681, 688–89 (2010) (discussing Rule 23 amendment history). Perry and Brass represented Wal-Mart in Dukes. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2546 (2011)
(listing attorneys for each party).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) advisory committee’s notes (1966).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(2) advisory committee’s notes (1966).
There is only one paragraph dedicated to discussing Rule 23(b)(2), whereas the discussion of Rule 23(b)(3) is nearly five pages. See Statement on Behalf of the Advisory Comm.
on Civil Rules to the Standing Comm. on Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., at 5 (June 10, 1965), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Rul
esAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV06-1965.pdf [hereinafter Advisory Committee Statement].
There is only a single mention of due process in the Advisory Committee Statement. See
Advisory Committee Statement, supra note 62, at 9 (stating “in the end constitutional
standards of due process must be complied with or the member will not be bound by the
judgment”); see also Weber, supra note 37, at 371 (observing that the Rule 23 framers
“could not anticipate the role that the Rule would play” in “the explosion in civil rights
and antipoverty litigation . . . in the late 1960’s,” and consequently, “[t]he Advisory
Committee Note and Benjamin Kaplan’s 1967 article explaining the Advisory Committee’s intentions in the 1966 revisions treat subdivision (b)(2) almost as an afterthought”)
(citing Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 389 (1967)).
The Advisory Committee Statement notes that the 1966 revisions responded to “an insistent demand and need . . . to develop improved methods of handling disputes affecting
groups” going forward. See Advisory Committee Statement, supra note 62, at 7.

Nov. 2012]

DUE PROCESS LIMITATIONS AND RULE 23(b)(2)

631

Advisory Committee in the 1966 amendments of Rule 23 (or at least
65
one view of the Committee’s intentions). Professor Kaplan notes
that the earlier equity rules upon which Rule 23 is based paid little
attention to the details of procedural management of class actions
and the possibility of due process requirements for absent class
66
members. In revising the class action rules, the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee was particularly concerned with distinguishing between
what were seen as “natural” class actions and those actions for which
class resolution served efficiency goals instead of deriving naturally
67
from the type of claim. Rule 23(b)(2) was built largely on experi68
ence “in the civil rights field,” though not exclusively so.
Rule 23(b)(3) was the Civil Rules Advisory Committee’s attempt
to deal with situations that did not fit in the “natural” class action
arena, yet would be well-served by “advantages of economy of effort
and uniformity of result without undue dilution of procedural safe69
guards for members of the class or for the opposing party.” Because
these Rule 23(b)(3) class actions did not have a clear precursor in the
old class action rules, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee spent con70
siderable time setting out procedural safeguards, along with other
requirements to help courts manage the class action and ensure that
a class action was “‘superior’ to other means of disposing of the par71
ticular set of quarrels.” These procedural safeguards demonstrate
some concern with the due process rights of both plaintiffs and defendants. The Civil Rules Advisory Committee also addressed the
possibility of an opt-in provision for Rule 23(b)(3) classes, instead of
the opt-out provision, but concluded that it would not be fair to the
72
defendant.
65
66

67
68
69
70
71
72

!

Kaplan, supra note 63, at 379 (recapturing the Civil Rules Advisory Committee’s discussions during the 1966 amendments to Rule 23).
Id. (“Management questions, including notably the general question of the desirability of
providing some notice or information to class members, came to the fore in the professional appraisals of Hansberry v. Lee, decided in 1940.” (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S.
32 (1940))).
See Kaplan, supra note 63, at 386–87.
See id. at 389.
Id. at 390.
See id. at 390–92.
Id. at 390.
See id. at 397 (discussing the argument that “[i]t is unfair to a defendant opposing the
class . . . to subject him to possible liability toward individuals who remain passive after receiving notice”). While counter-intuitive, the defendant would not prefer an opt-in procedure because one of the appealing aspects of a class action is that all potential related
claims can be resolved in a single action. With an opt-in procedure, the defendant risks
being sued later by those former class members that chose not to opt in. Because class
members were required to opt in, the defendant does not have an exhaustive list of all
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The revised Rule 23 included a general provision listing discretionary steps that a court could take to better manage class actions of
all types, including a provision stating “that notice be given to some
or all members of the class informing them of any event in the action,
or of their opportunity to speak their piece on the adequacy of the
73
representation, or to intervene in the action.” In discussing criticism of this discretionary notice, Professor Kaplan notes that
“[n]otice which is fair in the circumstances of the case is a constitutional requirement,” and it is reasonable to “expect courts to work
toward providing the best practicable notice, as indeed
74
(c)(2) . . . requires.” This explanation lends support to the idea that
there is a constitutional right to notice in some class action circumstances, and that this right exists outside of the requirements of Rule
23.
Presumably the Civil Rules Advisory Committee felt that courts
were well equipped to determine the extent of notice required by the
Due Process Clause. Professor Kaplan’s observation about constitutional notice implies that the Civil Rules Advisory Committee did not
think that the same type of notice was required for every possible type
of class and set of facts. His article suggests that the lack of attention
to due process with regard to Rule 23(b)(2) classes was not because
due process was not a concern of the Committee. Instead, because
the Constitution already contained a guarantee of due process, there
was no need to mandate all the circumstances under which constitutional due process might require more for a Rule 23(b)(2) class action. Thus, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee arguably felt that
courts had the competence to determine the extent of protection required for absent class members by the Due Process Clause on a caseby-case basis.
2. Judicial Interpretation of Due Process Requirements in Mandatory
Classes
Prior to the 1966 Rule 23 amendments, the Supreme Court first
recognized the need to consider the due process rights of absent class

73
74

this potential plaintiffs. With the opt-out provision, in contrast, the defendant can fully
resolve all the claims in a single action, except those of the class members choosing to opt
out. But unlike the opt-in scenario, the defendant has an exhaustive list of those plaintiffs, and could potentially reach out proactively to resolve, if the defendant wished.
Id. at 394 (describing discretionary steps laid out within the revised Rule 23(d)(2)).
Id. at 396 (referencing Rule 23(c)(2)).
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75

members in 1940, in Hansberry v. Lee. In Hansberry, the Supreme
Court held that there was a “failure of due process” only when the
procedure adopted did not “fairly insure[] the protection of the in76
terests of absent parties who [were] to be bound by it.” A decade
later, the Supreme Court provided additional guidance in Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., holding that due process required
77
notice “reasonably calculated to reach interested parties.” Following
Mullane, only two Supreme Court class action decisions provide additional guidance on the due process requirements for classes certified
78
under Rule 23(b)(2).
Nearly a half-century after Hansberry, the Supreme Court’s decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts changed how courts viewed due
79
process in the context of class actions. Shutts involved a class action
80
seeking monetary relief, brought by investors in a gas company. The
class was certified under Kansas state law, instead of one of the Rule
81
23(b) classes. Each member of the nationwide class was provided
notice via mail, which explained the right to opt out of the litiga82
tion. The Kansas court’s jurisdiction over the absent, out-of-state
83
class members was challenged. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that due process required absent class members to affirma-

75

76

77
78

79

80
81
82
83

311 U.S. 32 (1940). This decision is cited in the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966
Rule 23 Amendments. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(2) advisory committee’s notes (1966) (citing Hansberry in support of the proposition that “mandatory notice pursuant to subdivision (c)(2), together with any discretionary notice which the court may find it advisable
to give under subdivision (d)(2), is designed to fulfill requirements of due process”).
Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 42. Hansberry laid open “[t]he task of specifying the requirements
of ‘adequacy’ that conform to due process” and that task has not yet been fully resolved.
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et. al., An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U.
PA. L. REV. 1849, 1948 (1998). For an argument that “Hansberry supports the proposition
that the failure to provide adequate representation violates due process if the adjudication binds an absent class member,” see Weber, supra note 37, at 384.
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318 (1950).
See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (considering whether due process requires absent class members to opt in to an action affirmatively); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999) (deciding whether due process requires opt-out rights
for absent class members in a 23(b)(1) action).
See Daniels, supra note 31, at 510 (arguing that, “[i]n the context of class actions, Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts substantially reconfigured the way in which courts view due process
rights”).
Shutts, 472 U.S. at 799.
Id. at 801.
Id.
See id. at 806 (“Reduced to its essentials, petitioner’s argument is that unless out-of-state
plaintiffs affirmatively consent, the Kansas courts may not exert jurisdiction over their
claims.”).
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84

tively opt in to the litigation. Holding that due process required “at
a minimum that an absent plaintiff be provided with an opportunity
to remove himself from the class” when monetary claims were involved, the Supreme Court affirmed the notice procedure and the
Kansas court’s jurisdiction over the absent, out-of-state class mem85
bers. However, the Supreme Court explicitly left open the question
of what the Due Process Clause required when only equitable relief
86
was sought.
In Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., the Supreme Court addressed the conditions for certification under the other mandatory class, Rule
87
23(b)(1). Specifically, the Court addressed the certification of “a
mandatory settlement class on a limited fund theory” under
88
23(b)(1)(B). A limited fund is where the money that is available
(i.e. the fund) is inadequate to compensate fully all the class mem89
bers. Ortiz involved an asbestos class action settlement, with substan90
tial monetary damages. Because of the monetary damages, the Supreme Court focused on the need for opt-out rights for the absent
91
class members. Drawing similarities to the situation in Shutts, the
Supreme Court explained that both cases involved extinguishing an
absent class member’s monetary claim and that minimum due pro-

84

85
86

87
88
89

90

91

See id. at 812 (“We reject petitioner’s contention that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that absent plaintiffs affirmatively ‘opt in’ to the class, rather
than be deemed members of the class if they do not ‘opt out.’”).
Id. at 811–12.
See id. at 811 n.3 (“Our holding today is limited to those class actions which seek to bind
known plaintiffs concerning claims wholly or predominately for money judgments. We
intimate no view concerning other types of class actions, such as those seeking equitable
relief. Nor, of course, does our discussion of personal jurisdiction address class actions
where the jurisdiction is asserted against a defendant class.” (emphasis omitted)); see also
Safranek, supra note 43, at 264 (observing that the Shutts “Court did not explain why the
Constitution required such an option solely in money damage cases” and noting that the
Shutts Court did not provide guidance on when a class action “was wholly or predominately for money judgments” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999).
Id.
An example is in bankruptcy when the claims of creditors exceed the amount available.
By aggregating the claims together, the total amount available can be equitably distributed to all the creditors, instead of creating a race to the courthouse, which would potentially leave some creditors empty-handed.
Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 824–25 (describing a negotiated “Global Settlement Agreement” valued
at $1.535 billion and a backup “Trilateral Settlement Agreement” that would provide $2
billion in the event that the Global Settlement agreement failed to win approval).
See id. at 846–48 (noting that “[t]he inherent tension between representative suits and the
day-in-court ideal is only magnified if applied to damages claims gathered in a mandatory
class”); see also Daniels, supra note 31, at 511 (observing that “minimum procedural due
process includes, among other things, the opportunity to opt out” (footnote omitted)).
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cess required that an absent class member be given the opportunity
92
to remove himself from the litigation. Finding that the settlement
class did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(b)(1)(B), the Su93
preme Court invalidated the settlement class.
In particular, the Supreme Court was concerned because the case
94
did not involve a true limited fund; instead, “the fund was limited . . . by the agreement of the parties,” which the Supreme Court
found to be at odds with the concept of limited funds embodied in
95
Rule 23(b)(1). The Supreme Court’s discomfort with mandatory
classes involving monetary damages is evidenced in the Court’s language: “[t]he inherent tension between representative suits and the
day-in-court ideal is only magnified if applied to damages claims gath96
ered in a mandatory class.” Some, or much, of the discomfort was
likely due to the Supreme Court’s finding that the case did not involve a true limited fund, not just the inclusion of monetary damages
97
in a mandatory class. It is not clear whether the Supreme Court
would have had the same due process concerns had the case involved
a true limited fund.
The Supreme Court has yet to rule definitively on the permissibil98
ity of monetary damages in Rule 23(b)(2) actions. To date, the Supreme Court has not provided clarification on the question of “when
absent class members have a constitutional right to [choose to] opt
out of [a] class action[] . . . assert[ing] monetary damages on their
99
behalf.” Twice the Supreme Court granted certiorari on this issue,
100
but in both cases, it dismissed the case as improvidently granted.
92

93
94

95
96
97
98

99
100

!

See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 848 (observing that “before an absent class member’s right of action
was extinguishable due process required that the member ‘receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation,’ and we said that ‘at a minimum . . . an
absent plaintiff [must] be provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the
class’” (alteration in original) (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812
(1985)).
Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 864–65.
See id. at 841 (describing a true limited fund as one “justified with reference to a ‘fund’
with a definitely ascertained limit, all of which would be distributed to satisfy all those
with liquidated claims based on a common theory of liability, by an equitable, pro rata
distribution”).
Id. at 848.
Id. at 846 (emphasis added).
See id. at 846–47.
See Daniels, supra note 31, at 511 (observing that, following Ortiz, “it is . . . unclear whether opt-out rights are required in all cases where monetary damages are involved or
whether they are necessary only in cases where such damages ‘predominate’”).
Id. at 500.
See Adams v. Robertson, 520 U.S. 83 (1997) (dismissing the writ as improvidently granted,
but noting that the Court remained interested in considering the issue of monetary dam-
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In the first of these cases that the Supreme Court dismissed as improvidently granted, Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. Brown, the Court dismissed the writ because it would have required resolution of “a con101
stitutional question that may [have been] entirely hypothetical.” In
the Court’s subsequent discussion, the Court observed that there was
“at least a substantial possibility” that “in actions seeking monetary
damages, classes [could] be certified only under Rule
102
23(b)(3) . . . and not under Rules 23(b)(1) and (b)(2).” The Court
presented this “substantial possibility” as a reason for avoiding the
due process issue. Three years later, the Supreme Court again granted certiorari on the issue, but again dismissed the case as improvi103
dently granted, in Adams v. Robertson. In Adams, the Supreme Court
simply noted its “continuing interest” in this issue before it dismissed
104
the case. As a result of the Supreme Court leaving the issue unresolved, Circuit Courts have taken different approaches to analyzing
whether monetary relief sought by class members can be certified
105
under Rule 23(b)(2).
D. Further Complications Raised by Preclusion Doctrine
Moreover, whether the due process protections afforded absent
class members are sufficient depends to some degree on the preclusive effect given to the class judgments in subsequent litigation. Generally, preclusion doctrine operates to prevent parties from relitigating the same issue or multiplying litigation by litigating differ106
Adequate
ent aspects of the same claim in subsequent litigation.
representation is a prerequisite for the application of issue and claim
107
preclusion to judgments in a class action.

101
102
103
104
105

106
107

ages in a Rule 23(b)(2) action); Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117 (1994) (declining to decide the question of whether monetary damages are permissible in Rule
23(b)(2) actions).
Ticor, 511 U.S. at 118.
Id. at 121.
Adams, 520 U.S. at 85.
Id. at 92 n.6.
See Julian W. Poon & Blaine H. Evanson, Class Distinctions, L.A. LAWYER, Feb. 2011, at 18–
20. See also infra Part II.B (discussing the approaches taken by the circuits and the impact
of Dukes on the continued viability of the various circuit tests).
See infra Part I.D.1.
See infra Part I.D.2.
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1. Background on Preclusion
There are two types of preclusion: issue preclusion and claim
108
preclusion. Issue preclusion bars parties from re-litigating an issue
if the parties previously litigated the issue involved and the issue was
109
determined and necessary to the judgment. Claim preclusion bars
parties from raising any claim that was brought or should have been
brought in prior litigation when that litigation resulted in a judgment
110
on the merits. Due process, as a general rule, prevents both preclusion doctrines from applying to those who were not parties in the
111
original litigation.
There are limited exceptions to this general rule that only parties
may be bound by preclusion doctrine; one exception is for Rule 23
112
class actions. The nonparty absent class members are bound by the
class action judgment, even though they were not parties in the orig113
inal action in the traditional sense. Until recently, the literature has
overlooked the implications of giving class action decisions preclusive

108

109

110
111

112

113

There are four sources of the rules governing inter-jurisdictional preclusion: (1) the Full
Faith and Credit Statute, see 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006) (stating that all “Acts, records and
judicial proceedings . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States . . . as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State . . . from which
they are taken”); (2) the Full Faith and Credit Clause, see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full
Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”); (3) the Supremacy Clause, see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2
(stating that the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding”); and (4) Article III of the Constitution, see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish.”); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (stating that
the “judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution” and listing other areas to which the federal judicial power extends).
See 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 132.01 (3d ed. 1997). The
discussion of preclusion doctrine is significantly streamlined for the purposes of this
Comment.
See id. at § 131.01 (citing the classic formulation from Cromwell v. Cnty of Sac., 94 U.S. 351,
352 (1876)).
See MOORE, supra note 109, at §§ 131.40, 132.04. See also Bassett, supra note 43, at 1097
(observing that courts are generally “cognizant that the preclusion doctrines may only be
applied under circumstances that comport with constitutional due process”).
See Bassett, supra note 43, at 1110 (noting that class actions are “the most attenuated of all
the nonparty exceptions” and are “distinctive even within the representative suit exception”).
See, e.g., Bassett, supra note 43, at 1079 (noting that class members do not enjoy direct
representation in litigation).
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effect when absent class members seek to raise issues or claims similar
114
to those litigated in the class action.
The purpose of the preclusion doctrines is to “relieve parties of
the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources,
and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on ad115
judication.” These practical concerns are present in the class action
context as well, but class actions also raise concerns about the ability
of absent class members to choose to participate in litigation. In Rule
23(b)(3) classes, parties are given the opportunity to opt out of the
116
litigation, and thus, absent class members in 23(b)(3) classes have
an opportunity to make a choice about whether to remain in the
class. Presumably those who wanted to try to get a better result on
their own chose to opt out of the class.
In contrast, the fact that Rule 23 does not require notice and opt117
out rights for class members in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action raises a
potential problem when preclusion doctrine is applied to bar absent
class members from litigating the same issues or a related claim. Similar justifications support the use of preclusion for Rule 23(b)(2)
judgments when applied in a later action seeking the same sort of relief, i.e., injunctive relief, as support the lack of additional requirements in certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) class, namely the indivisible na118
ture of the remedy. Given the indivisible nature of injunctive relief
114

115
116

117
118

!

For a detailed examination of preclusion in the context of class actions and a framework
for “allow[ing] courts to reclaim their proper role in constraining the preclusive effects of
the class proceedings that they shepherd to judgment,” see generally Wolff, Preclusion in
Class Action Litigation, supra note 46, at 717.
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v) (describing the requirement that notice, in Rule
23(b)(3) classes, must state “that the court will exclude from the class any member who
requests exclusion”).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (specifying, as the only notice requirement in Rule
23(b)(2) classes, that “the court may direct appropriate notice to the class”).
See AM. LAW INST., supra note 26, at § 2.04 cmt. a (2010). Section 2.04 defines indivisible
remedies as “those such that the distribution of relief to any claimant as a practical matter
determines the application or availability of the same remedy to other claimants.” Id. at
§ 2.04(b). Section 2.04 continues by noting that:
court[s] may authorize aggregate treatment of common issues concerning an indivisible remedy by way of a class action, with no requirement . . . that claimants . . . be afforded an opportunity to exclude themselves . . . . Aggregate treatment as to an indivisible remedy may be appropriate even though additional
divisible remedies are also available that warrant individual treatment . . . .
Id. at § 2.04(c). Section 2.04 explains that “considerations of due process generally require that the court determine the distribution of divisible remedies on an aggregate basis only upon affording claimants an opportunity to escape the preclusive effect of that
determination.” Id. at § 2.04(c) cmt. a. However, claim preclusion operates differently;
there is an exception to the general rule against claim splitting, when the court in the
original action “expressly reserved the plaintiff’s right to maintain the second action . . . .”
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usually sought in Rule 23(b)(2) classes, it is neither feasible nor logical for parties to opt out of the class to get a better, or different, in119
junction on their own.
In addition, preclusion gives defendants incentives to settle the
class action to conclusively determine and extinguish their liability in
120
a single action.
Class actions, “[a]s a procedural device, . . . would
likely suffer an immediate decline in utility if a class judgment carried
121
only precedential value without preclusive effect.” The application
of preclusion doctrines to class actions, thus, makes it more attractive
for defendants to resolve the class claims. This, in turn, helps both
the representative plaintiffs and the absent class members get relief
and resolution.
2. Due Process, Preclusion Doctrine, and Collateral Attacks
Traditionally, the view has been that adequate representation is a
necessary precursor to the application of preclusion against absent
122
class members. This traditional approach dates back to Hansberry v.
123
In the last decade, there has been a growing debate
Lee, in 1940.
over “whether an absent class member may attack a class judgment
124
for inadequate representation in subsequent litigation.”

119

120
121
122

123
124

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW: JUDGMENTS 2d § 26(1)(b) (1982). There is at least
a possibility here that when a court certifies a Rule 23(b)(2) class that excludes damages
relief, a subsequent court could interpret that as an express reservation of the plaintiff’s
right to maintain a later action for damages relief. I am indebted to Professor Struve for
this suggestion.
For an example involving alleged pattern-or-practice employment discrimination, see AM.
LAW INST., supra note 26, § 2.04 illus. 5. While employees’ claims for backpay are divisible
remedies, “the court should consider whether aggregate treatment of any common issues
concerning Defendant’s liability will determine, in practical effect, the availability and
method for the distribution of backpay.” Id. If it does, then the court may treat the
claims for backpay on an aggregate basis. Id.
See, e.g., Weber, supra note 37, at 375 (observing that “[t]he value of suits such as Mullane
lies in their preclusion, by res judicata, of all potential claims over the accounts”).
See Bassett, supra note 43, at 1116.
See 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4455, at 485
(2d ed. 2002) (“It has long been the general understanding that only adequate representation can justify preclusion against nonparticipating class members.”); see also Bassett, supra note 43, at 1099 (observing that the preclusion analysis is set within an adequate representation framework); Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, supra note 46, at 742
(observing that preclusion is often thought about under the “rubric of adequacy of representation”).
See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45–46 (1940) (allowing absent class members to collaterally attack the class judgment on the ground that they were inadequately represented).
Patrick Woolley, Collateral Attack and the Role of Adequate Representation in Class Suits for
Money Damages, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 917, 917 (2010).
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Starting with an influential article criticizing the long-held view,
there has been a push by critics of the traditional view to narrow the
“traditional availability of collateral attack for inadequate representa126
tion.”
A collateral attack allows a party to challenge the enforce127
ment of a prior judgment. Thus, an absent class member is able to
challenge the class action judgment on the grounds that there was
inadequate representation. One scholar, Professor Woolley, argues
that this narrowing is “inconsistent with the proper interpretation of
128
class action rules and the Constitution.” Professor Woolley explains
that “[t]he foundation of the traditional approach to adequate representation rests on the recognition that the ‘interest’ protected by the
adequate representation requirement is the constitutionallyprotected property interest of an individual class member in his or
129
her claim.”
Both preclusion doctrine and Rule 23 depend on the adequacy of
representation. This raises some troubling issues when considering
the inclusion of monetary damages in Rule 23(b)(2) actions. The absent class members in these suits may not know about the litigation,
yet not only are they bound by it, but they also have limited opportunity to challenge the adequacy of the representation in the original
130
class proceeding.
Preclusion doctrine, and the potentially limited
availability of a collateral attack for inadequate representation, exacerbate the due process concerns raised in Rule 23(b)(2) classes. Additionally, these due process concerns may become more pressing,
depending on how the debate over the availability of collateral attacks for inadequate representation plays out.
II. EFFECT OF WAL-MART V. DUKES ON EXISTING JUDICIAL STANDARDS
FOR MONETARY DAMAGES IN RULE 23(B)(2) CLASSES
Prior to Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the existing case law regarding when claims for monetary damages could be certified along with
125

126
127
128
129
130

Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for “Adequacy” in Class Actions: A
Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765 (1998) (proposing that, instead of
the traditional approach that there must have been adequate representation in order to
apply preclusion against absent class members, incentives should be provided to all parties to participate in the original action, coupled with a narrower, process-based standard
for collateral attack).
Woolley, supra note 124, at 919.
See MOORE, supra note 109, at § 130.06.
Woolley, supra note 124, at 920.
Id. at 921.
Additionally, if the narrowing of the availability of collateral attacks described by Professor Woolley continues, it will be even more difficult to collaterally attack.
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claims for injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2) had resulted in a circuit split. The Supreme Court had previously observed in dicta that
there was a “substantial possibility” that claims for monetary damages
could “be certified only under Rule 23(b)(3),” but had declined to
131
fully resolve the question. The Supreme Court’s discussion in WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes of monetary remedies in Rule 23(b)(2) classes emphasizes the history of Rule 23 and the Rule’s structure. Dukes
significantly limits the standards that had been used by lower courts
in assessing when Rule 23(b)(2) classes involving monetary damages
could be certified. A close reading of the Supreme Court’s decision
suggests that the Court’s limitation on monetary remedies in Rule
23(b)(2) can be understood as having been motivated by due process
concerns. In addition, the lack of an outright prohibition on claims
for monetary relief in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions is consistent with
the 1966 Civil Rules Advisory Committee’s implied understanding of
a court’s ability to determine the due process required for Rule
23(b)(2) classes on a case-by-case basis.
A. Wal-Mart v. Dukes Leaves Open the Question of the Permissibility of
Monetary Damages in a Rule 23(b)(2) Class
Given the lack of clarity surrounding the question of when, if at
all, monetary damages could be included in a Rule 23(b)(2) class,
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes was an opportunity for the Supreme
Court to provide clarification. Indeed the Court granted certiorari to
132
address this question.
The Supreme Court unanimously held that
the class in Dukes was not one that could be certified under Rule
133
23(b)(2).
However, the Court passed on the opportunity to provide guidance on whether monetary damages could ever be certified
134
under Rule 23(b)(2), addressing it only speculatively in dicta.
Thus, the Supreme Court’s decision explicitly left unanswered the
question with which the circuits were struggling. The Supreme Court

131
132

133
134

Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 121 (1994).
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 795, 795 (2010) (granting certiorari to address Question 1 presented by the petition); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2010) (No. 10-277) (“Whether claims for monetary
relief can be certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2)—which by its
terms is limited to injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief—and, if so, under what
circumstances.”).
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557.
In addition, the Supreme Court held that the certification of the plaintiff class in Dukes
was inconsistent with the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2552–
53. This Comment does not discuss that portion of the decision.
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found that plaintiffs’ damages were not incidental because they
would require individual determination and were significant in dollar
135
amount. Because the Court found that the monetary damages predominated over the injunctive relief sought, it chose not to address
the question of what level of monetary damages might be allowable
136
under Rule 23(b)(2).
Instead, the Court held simply that the
“claims for individualized relief” in Dukes did not satisfy Rule
137
23(b)(2). The Court followed this with an observation in dicta that
the Court was not sure if there were any forms of incidental monetary
relief that would be consistent with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2) and that would also comply with the Due Pro138
cess Clause.
1. Focus on the Historical Uses of Class Actions
In Dukes, the Supreme Court emphasized the historical approach
that it had taken in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp. when seeking to determine
the types of classes properly brought under each of the subdivisions
139
of 23(b). In Ortiz, the Court was particularly concerned about the
significant monetary damages sought and the lack of an opportunity
for absent class members to opt out. Additionally, the Supreme
Court in Dukes found persuasive the illustrative examples in the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 23, which indicate that Rule 23(b)(2)
140
was based on experience with the civil rights field.
The Court observed that the Advisory Committee Notes contained no examples of
135
136
137

138

139

140

Id. at 2560–61.
Id. at 2560.
Id. at 2557 (concluding that “at a minimum, claims for individualized relief (like the
backpay at issue here) [did] not satisfy the Rule,” and not reaching the broader question
of whether incidental monetary damages would ever be consistent with Rule 23(b)(2) because “the monetary relief [was] not incidental to the injunctive or declaratory relief”
(emphasis omitted)).
See id. at 2560 (“We need not decide in this case whether there are any forms of ‘incidental’ monetary relief that are consistent with the interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2) we
have announced and that comply with the Due Process Clause.”).
See id. at 2557 (acknowledging Rule 23’s roots in equity and the Supreme Court’s focus
on “the historical models on which the Rule was based” in Ortiz). For a more in-depth argument from Wal-Mart’s counsel of why Ortiz’s historical analysis should be applied to an
analysis of the classes that properly belong under 23(b)(2), see generally Perry & Brass,
supra note 59.
See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557 (“Civil rights cases against parties charged with unlawful,
class-based discrimination are prime examples of what (b)(2) is meant to capture.”); see
also FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (1966) (“Illustrative [of Rule 23(b)(2)]
are various actions in the civil-rights field . . . .”); Kaplan, supra note 63, at 389 (explaining
that the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were “building on experience mainly, but not exclusively, in the civil rights field”).
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predecessors to Rule 23(b)(2) involving claimants who combined individual claims for monetary relief with class-wide claims for injunc141
tive relief. Based on these historical models, the Court concluded
that the key to a Rule 23(b)(2) class was the “indivisible nature of the
142
injunctive or declaratory remedy.”
The Supreme Court observed that the discussion in the Advisory
Committee Notes of the historical precursors to Rule 23(b)(2) does
not include either classes seeking relief that would entitle individuals
“to a different injunction or declaratory judgment against the defendant” or classes seeking relief that would entitle each class member “to
143
an individualized award of monetary damages.”
The Advisory
Committee Notes to which the Supreme Court refers do not emphasize due process concerns in the discussion of Rule 23(b)(2), and
their treatment of Rule 23(b)(2) relative to the Rule 23(b)(3), which
144
does deal with procedural due process concerns, is quite sparse.
However, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee did not focus on due
process in its discussion of Rule 23(b)(2) because of a likely underlying assumption that courts were competent to determine, without
guidance from the Rules of Civil Procedure, the extent of protection
required by the Due Process Clause for absent class members. The
Supreme Court’s hesitation to unilaterally prohibit certification of
any monetary damages under Rule 23(b)(2) is consistent with the
Civil Rules Advisory Committee’s underlying expectations that courts
would determine, on a case-by-case basis, the due process rights necessary for absent class members in Rule 23(b)(2) classes.
The focus on Rule 23’s historical roots can be understood as a desire to distinguish between the “natural” class actions and those al145
lowed primarily for efficiency reasons.
The Court’s language sug141

142

143
144
145

!

See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2558 (“In none of the cases cited by the Advisory Committee as
examples of (b)(2)’s antecedents did the plaintiffs combine any claim for individualized
relief with their class-wide injunction.”).
Id. at 2557. This is consistent with the discussion of indivisible and divisible remedies in
AM. LAW INST., supra note 26, § 2.04 (“As a general matter, ‘indivisible remedies’ are those
handled primarily under Rules 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) . . . .”); see also discussion supra note
118.
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557.
See supra Part I.B.
By “natural” class actions, I mean generally those that fit the requirements of Rules
23(b)(1) and (b)(2), in which adjudication by one member of the class thus necessarily
impacts the other class members. Take, for example, the following situation. There is a
bus accident with 119 victims. The bus company is insolvent, but has an insurance policy
limit of $1.5 million. If the first victim sues the bus company by herself, then whatever
amount she is awarded is taken out of the $1.5 million available to all the victims. Because this situation involves a limited fund, it falls within the category of a “natural” class
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gests that it agrees with the Civil Rules Advisory Committee’s sense
that in these “natural” class actions, today’s mandatory classes, the
Due Process Clause demands less because of the type of claim being
brought. This makes sense because, for example, in the sort of civil
rights action upon which Rule 23(b)(2) was based, the idea of a single absent class member trying to opt out of the injunction or declaratory judgment makes little sense and would most likely be infeasible.
The defendant is either enjoined from continuing to use its racially
discriminatory policies, or not. Further, providing mandatory notice
to all class members in the classic civil rights actions upon which Rule
23(b)(2) is based would often be prohibitively expensive.
2. Emphasis on Structure of Rule 23
In addition, the Supreme Court focused intently on the structure
of Rule 23. Given the Rule’s structure, the Court observed that “it
[is] clear that individualized monetary claims belong in Rule
146
23(b)(3).”
Here again, the Court relied on the Advisory Committee’s Notes, noting its observation in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor
that Rule 23(b)(3) was an “‘adventuresome innovation’” of the 1966
147
Rule Amendments. The Court focused on the rule’s structural differences in requirements for Rule 23(b)(3) classes as compared to
Rule 23(b)(2) classes. The Court emphasized that the mandatory
classes lack the additional protections of Rule 23(b)(3), not because
Rule 23 finds these protections unnecessary, but instead “because
148
[the Rule] considers them unnecessary to a (b)(2) class.”
In acknowledging that notice is missing from Rule 23(b)(2)’s requirements, the Court is careful to add that this is “presumably because it is thought (rightly or wrongly) that notice has no purpose
when the class is mandatory, and that depriving people of their right

146
147
148

action. In contrast, take the case in which a CD manufacturer overcharged for its CDs.
All consumers who purchased CDs in the past five years paid $0.02 more per CD than
they should have. Here, for efficiency reasons, it would make sense to bring a class action
on behalf of all consumers who purchased CDs in the past five years because the amount
per CD otherwise is too low to justify individual claims. However, one consumer’s ability
to get compensation from the CD manufacturer does not impact another consumer’s
ability to do so.
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2558.
Id. at 2558 (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997)).
Id. at 2558 (“The procedural protections attending the (b)(3) class—predominance, superiority, mandatory notice, and the right to opt out—are missing from (b)(2) not because the Rule considers them unnecessary, but because it considers them unnecessary to
a (b)(2) class.”).
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149

to sue in this manner complies with the Due Process Clause.” The
Court contrasts this with its prior holding in Shutts, that the “absence
of notice and opt-out [rights] violates due process” in class actions
150
predominantly for monetary relief.
Claims for monetary damages
play an important role in how the Court thinks about the absent class
members’ due process rights. Acknowledging that it had not yet addressed due process requirements in cases where classes seek monetary relief that does not predominate, the Court observed that there
is a “serious possibility” that due process would require notice and
151
opt-out rights in any class seeking monetary relief. The Court sug152
gested this as its reason for declining to read Rule 23(b)(2) broadly.
But the Court stopped short of holding that due process did require
notice and opt-out rights in any class action seeking monetary relief.
The Supreme Court’s emphasis on the structure of Rule 23 is reminiscent of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee’s emphasis on the
procedural safeguards for Rule 23(b)(3) classes. The Civil Rules Advisory Committee’s procedural safeguards in Rule 23(b)(3) classes
were motivated by due process concerns, as well as manageability
153
concerns. Thus, the Court’s focus on the structure of Rule 23 as a
reason to reject certification of large, individualized monetary damages under Rule 23(b)(2) is likely explained by due process concerns.
In addition, underlying the Civil Rules Advisory Committee’s lack of
attention to due process in relation to Rule 23(b)(2) class action was
an assumption that the courts were bound by the Due Process Clause
to address due process concerns on a case-by-case basis for Rule
23(b)(2) classes. The Dukes Court’s push of this particular class towards the greater protections required by Rule 23(b)(3) may have
been its way of doing just that.

149
150

151
152

153

Id. at 2559.
Id. at 2559 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (“The plaintiff must receive notice . . . . Additionally, we hold that due process requires . . . that an
absent plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the class by executing and returning an ‘opt out’ . . . form to the court.”)).
Dukes, 132 S. Ct. at 2559.
See id. at 2559 (“[T]he serious possibility that it may be so provides an additional reason
not to read Rule 23(b)(2) to include the monetary claims here.”). The Supreme Court’s
desire to punt on this issue is consistent with its decisions in Ticor and Adams; both times
the Court certified this question, but dismissed the grant of certiorari as improvidently
granted. See Adams v. Robertson, 520 U.S. 83 (1997); Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511
U.S. 117 (1994).
See supra Part I.C.1.
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3. Appropriate Standard for Determining When Monetary Damages Can
Be Included in a Rule 23(b)(2) Class
Finally, the Supreme Court addressed which standard to use when
evaluating whether monetary damages might be brought under Rule
23(b)(2), the question on which circuits were split. When the Ninth
Circuit upheld the certification of Dukes under Rule 23(b)(2), it had
created a third standard, thereby adding to the existing circuit split.
The Supreme Court’s clarification of this issue is limited.
The Ninth Circuit had held that Rule 23(b)(2) authorizes any action with monetary damages, so long as the monetary relief does not
154
predominate. The Ninth Circuit’s standard relied on the definition
of “predominate” and the Advisory Committee Note’s explanatory
155
statement.
After relying heavily on the Advisory Committee Notes
previously, the Supreme Court was dismissive of the plaintiff’s reliance on those same Notes: “[o]f course it is the Rule itself, not the
156
Advisory Committee’s description of it, that governs.”
Certainly,
there is a distinction between how the Supreme Court and the Ninth
Circuit are using the Advisory Committee Notes. However, given the
importance the Notes play in the Court’s earlier analysis, the Court’s
approach here is quite dismissive.
Emphasizing its earlier arguments about the structure of Rule 23,
the Supreme Court observed that, were it to accept the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the Advisory Committee Notes, parties could
avoid the protections that the Rules Committee considered critical to
classes seeking Rule 23(b)(3) certification simply by adding “predom157
inating” injunctive relief to their monetary claims.
The Court was
troubled by the idea that absent class members might be denied

154
155

156
157

See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 616–17 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct.
2541 (2011).
See id. at 616 (“Merriam-Webster defines ‘predominant’ as ‘having superior strength, influence, or authority: prevailing.’ To be certified under Rule 23(b)(2), therefore, a class
must seek only monetary damages that are not ‘superior [in] strength, influence, or authority’ to injunctive and declaratory relief.” (internal citation omitted) (alteration in
original)), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s
notes (1966) (stating that Rule 23(b)(2) “does not extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money damages”).
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2559.
See id. (“We fail to see why the Rule should be read to nullify these protections whenever a
plaintiff class, at its option, combines its monetary claims with a request—even a “‘predominating request’—for an injunction.”).
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compensatory damages for their valid employment discrimination
158
claims if backpay were denied in this class action.
The Supreme Court also discussed the Fifth Circuit’s “incidental”
damages test, which defines incidental damages as those “flow[ing]
159
directly from liability to the class as a whole.” The Court considered
whether the Fifth Circuit’s incidental test was consistent with its in160
terpretation of Rule 23(b)(2) and with the Due Process Clause.
Sidestepping a decision on this precise issue, the Supreme Court held
that because “Wal-Mart is entitled to individualized determinations of
each employee’s eligibility for backpay,” the “incidental” test could
161
not be met.
The Supreme Court further explained that “a class
cannot be certified on the premise that Wal-Mart will not be entitled
162
to litigate its statutory defenses to individual claims.” The Supreme
Court declined to offer a definition of “incidental.” As a result, the
Court’s decision may lead to a shift in the understanding of the incidental test to something that considers whether the damages are in163
dividualized.
Thus, due process considerations run throughout the Supreme
Court’s analysis, even if these considerations are at times below the
surface. Due process considerations are behind the Court’s concern
with the potential of a plaintiff precluded from later bringing a compensatory action for discrimination; likewise, due process considerations are behind the Court’s concern with a defendant not able to litigate its statutory defense. Despite granting certiorari to resolve the
circuit split on when monetary damages can be included under Rule
23(b)(2), the Court did only a mediocre job of providing guidance
on the issue. However, the Court’s decision can be harmonized with
the 1966 Civil Rules Advisory Committee’s implied view of due process for mandatory classes. The Committee presumably felt that
courts had the competence to determine the extent of protection re158

159
160

161
162
163

See id. (“That possibility underscores the need for plaintiffs with individual monetary
claims to decide for themselves whether to tie their fates to the class representatives’ or go it
alone—a choice Rule 23(b)(2) does not ensure that they have.”).
Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998); see also infra Part
II.B.2.
See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2560 (“We need not decide in this case whether there are any
forms of ‘incidental’ monetary relief that are consistent with the interpretation of Rule
23(b)(2) we have announced and that comply with the Due Process Clause.”).
Id.
Id. at 2561.
See John C. Coffee, Jr., “You Just Can’t Get There From Here”: A Primer on Wal-Mart v. Dukes,
80 U.S.L.W. (BNA) 93 (July 19, 2011) (“But after Wal-Mart, that ‘incidental’ standard may
not survive and the focus may shift to whether the damages are ‘individualized’ or uniform.”).

648

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15:2

quired by the Due Process Clause on a case-by-case basis. While the
Court could have held that the monetary relief in Dukes was not suitable for certification under Rule 23(b)(2) because all claims for
monetary relief were inconsistent with Rule 23(b)(2) class actions, it
did not. Instead, the Court held that the monetary relief in Dukes was
inappropriate for Rule 23(b)(2) because it required individual determination and was significant. The Court’s hesitation to state a
blanket rule regarding whether monetary relief was appropriate for
certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is consistent with addressing due
process on a more case-by-case basis.
B. Impact on Lower Courts’ Interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2)’s Requirements
Prior to Dukes, circuits had taken different approaches to handling
classes seeking injunctive and/or declaratory relief, as well as mone164
tary damages. These approaches were developed in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. Brown, which left
unresolved the question of whether class actions with monetary dam165
ages could be certified under Rule 23(b)(2).
With the Ninth Circuit’s certification of the class in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, a third
166
standard was adopted—the predominance standard.
In Dukes, the Supreme Court yet again granted certiorari on the
issue of whether the absent class members in classes asserting monetary damages on their behalf have a constitutional right to opt out of
the class. However, the Court has yet to render a decision on the is167
sue. Dukes presented an opportunity for the Court to step in to resolve the circuit split and provide guidance to future class actions.
The Supreme Court explicitly addressed two of the existing circuit
tests: the Ninth Circuit’s predominance test and the Fifth Circuit’s
incidental test. The Court did not discuss the Second Circuit’s balancing test.

164

165
166

167

See Daniels, supra note 31, at 500 (“[T]he constitutional rights of absent class members
continue to create considerable controversy among the circuits, specifically in the area of
opt-out rights concerning monetary damage claims.”).
See supra Part I.C.
Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 616 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting the Second
Circuit’s “subjective intent” balancing test and the Fifth Circuit’s “incidental damages
standard” in favor of a new approach that turns on whether or not monetary damages
predominate over injunctive and declaratory relief), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (U.S. 2011).
The Supreme Court had previously granted certiorari on this issue in Adams v. Robertson,
520 U.S. 83 (1997), and Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117 (1994). See supra Part
I.C.
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1. Ninth Circuit’s Predominance Test
The Ninth Circuit created a three-way circuit split in the standard
used to assess whether classes seeking both equitable relief and mon168
etary relief could be certified under Rule 23(b)(2). The source of
the Ninth Circuit’s standard was the Advisory Committee’s Note to
Rule 23, which states that Rule 23(b)(2) “does not extend to cases in
which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly
169
to money damages.”
Relying on the dictionary definition of “predominate,” the Ninth Circuit formulated a new standard for assessing
when classes seeking monetary relief could be certified under
23(b)(2): “[t]o be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) . . . a class must
seek only monetary damages that are not superior in strength, influ170
ence, or authority to injunctive and declaratory relief.”
The Su171
preme Court explicitly rejected this approach in Dukes.
2. Fifth Circuit’s Incidental Test
Following Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. Brown, the Fifth Circuit was
the first appellate court to address the issue of classes seeking both
equitable relief and monetary relief, doing so in Allison v. Citgo Petro172
leum Corp.. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that many circuits had
taken the position that monetary relief is acceptable under Rule
173
23(b)(2), so long as it does not predominate over other claims.
Recognizing that notice and opt-out rights were to be balanced
against the “need and efficiency of a class action,” the Fifth Circuit
concluded that: “monetary relief predominates in (b)(2) class actions unless it is incidental to requested injunctive or declaratory re-

168

169
170
171

172

173

See Poon & Evanson, supra note 105, at 18, 20 (noting the three-way split between the
Ninth Circuit’s new predominance test, the Fifth Circuit’s incidental test, and the Second
Circuit’s balancing test).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes (1966); see also Dukes, 603 F.3d at 615 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes (1966)).
Dukes, 603 F.3d at 616 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560 (2011) (rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s approach and observing that in face of the challenges in determining backpay
claims, the Ninth Circuit should not have imposed an “arbitrary limitation on class membership,” but instead should have concluded that the “backpay claims should not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) at all”).
Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Natasha Dasani,
Note, Class Actions and the Interpretation of Monetary Damages Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 171–72 (2006) (discussing Allison and the development of the incidental damages test).
See Allison, 151 F.3d at 411 (collecting cases).
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174

lief.” The Fifth Circuit defined incidental as “damages that flow directly from liability to the class as a whole on the claims forming the
175
basis of the injunctive or declaratory relief.”
Importantly, the Fifth Circuit limited incidental damages to “those
to which class members automatically would be entitled once liability
176
to the class (or subclass) as a whole is established.” The Fifth Circuit clarified that “incidental damages should not require additional
177
hearings” or “entail complex individualized determinations.” Prior
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, several courts approved class certification under Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule
23(b)(2) even though substantial monetary damages were requested,
178
relying on the Fifth Circuit’s test.
The Supreme Court did not directly rule on the permissibility of
179
the Fifth Circuit’s incidental test. However, in the cases addressing
the impact of Dukes on certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class, courts
have concluded that Dukes overruled a portion of the Fifth Circuit’s
180
incidental test.
Courts in the Fifth Circuit read Dukes as clarifying
the existing Fifth Circuit law interpreting the requirements of Rule
181
23(b)(2). However, none of the cases deal with monetary damages
174
175
176
177
178

179
180

181

!

Id. at 414–15.
Id. at 415.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Smith v. Crystian, 91 F. App’x 952, 954 (5th Cir. 2004) (affirming mandatory class
certification under (b)(1)(A) or (b)(2) even though there were substantial damages present), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1089 (2005); see also Poon, supra note 105, at 20 (observing that
several circuits follow the Fifth Circuit’s incidental test) (citing Reeb v. Ohio Dep’t of
Rehab. & Corr., 435 F. 3d 639 (6th Cir. 2006); Barabin v. Aramark Corp., No. 02–8057,
2003 WL 355417 (3d Cir. Jan. 24, 2003); Murray v. Auslander, 244 F. 3d 807 (11th Cir.
2001); Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l Inc., 195 F. 3d 894 (7th Cir. 1999)).
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560 (2011).
See, e.g., FPX, LLC v. Google, Inc., 276 F.R.D. 543, 552 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (“In reaching this
decision [in Dukes], the Supreme Court overruled, at least in part, Fifth Circuit precedent
that claims for monetary relief are permissible in a(b)(2) [sic] class so long as injunctive
or declaratory relief is the predominant relief sought.”); Morrow v. Washington, 277
F.R.D. 172, 202 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (noting the same). The Eastern District of Texas certified “a [Rule 23](b)(2) class for injunctive and declaratory relief” in Morrow, but noted
that it did not need to resolve the question of monetary relief in connection with the
23(b)(2) class because the claims in this case could not even satisfy the Allison standard.
Morrow, 277 F.R.D. at 197, 203.
M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, is one example of such a case. 675 F.3d 832, 845 (5th Cir.
2012) (holding that the lower court “abused its discretion” in certifying a class under
23(b)(2), and observing that the Fifth Circuit has interpreted 23(b)(2)’s provisions “to
create two relevant requirements when a proposed class seeks classwide injunctive relief:
(1) the class members must have been harmed in essentially the same way, . . . and (2)
the injunctive relief sought must be specific” (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). The Fifth Circuit explained that Dukes elaborated on the requirements
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falling within the Fifth Circuit’s incidental test, and consequently, the
cases addressing class certification in the wake of Dukes can rely on
the fact that the monetary damages would not have even satisfied
182
Fifth Circuit law pre-Dukes.
Given the Supreme Court’s focus on the class-wide nature of the
Rule 23(b)(2) damages, a narrowly construed interpretation of the
incidental test likely would be consistent with the Supreme Court’s
Rule 23(b)(2) interpretation. Such a narrowly construed incidental
test would require a class in which the monetary damages “flow di183
rectly from liability to the class as a whole.” However, it is not clear
that this is true in many of the class actions seeking both equitable
and monetary relief today. One scholar argues that post-Dukes the
Fifth Circuit’s incidental test may change to put more emphasis on
whether the damages are individual than on whether they are inci184
dental.
In light of the Supreme Court’s observation in dicta that
due process may require notice and opt-out rights for a class seeking
any monetary relief, the Fifth Circuit’s incidental test may not meet

182

183
184

of Rule 23(b)(2): “Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory
judgment would provide relief to each member of the class” and that for “[f]or a class
certified under Rule 23(b)(2), ‘the relief sought must perforce affect the entire class at
once.’” Id. (citing Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557–58). In Stukenberg, “[t]he proposed class
[sought] at least twelve broad, classwide injunctions, which would require the district
court to institute and oversee a complete overhaul of Texas’s foster care system.” Id. The
Fifth Circuit acknowledged that “some of the proposed class’s sub-claims could potentially be certified under Rule 23(b)(2),” but ultimately found “that the proposed class claims
[did] not satisfy Rule 23(b)(2) because they include[d] claims for individualized injunctive relief,” which the Fifth Circuit found explicitly barred by the Supreme Court’s decision in Dukes. Id. at 846.
See, e.g., Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless, No. 6:01–2148, 2011 WL 5553829,
at *7 (W.D. La. Nov. 9, 2011) (noting that the court’s “findings and conclusions . . . [were] also influenced by a recent Supreme Court opinion[] [Dukes],” which
“held that [Rule] 23(b)(2) precludes class treatment where monetary relief is not merely
incidental to injunctive or declaratory relief that might be available” and that
“[i]ndividualized monetary claims belong in . . . Rule 23(b)(3)”); FPX, 276 F.R.D. at 550,
553 (noting that “class treatment under Rule 23(b)(2) is not appropriate [under Fifth
Circuit law] where resolution of the claims at issue would require complex individualized
determinations and numerous individualized hearings” and holding that the “individualized nature of each class member’s . . . claim precludes certification under Rule
23(b)(2)” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Altier v. Worley Catastrophe Response, LLC, Nos. 11–241 & 11–242, 2011 WL 3205229, at *10–11 (E.D. La. July
26, 2011) (explaining that class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) was inappropriate because plaintiffs were not seeking injunctive or declaratory relief and were only seeking
monetary relief, and relying on prior Fifth Circuit precedent while noting that “Dukes recently clarified that Rule 23(b)(2) does not authorize a class action when individualized
claims for monetary relief predominate”).
Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998) (emphasis omitted).
See Coffee, supra note 163 (“[A]fter [Dukes], that ‘incidental’ standard may not survive
and the focus may shift to whether the damages are ‘individualized’ or uniform.”).
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the additional requirements of the Due Process Clause, as interpreted
by the Dukes Court.
3. Second Circuit’s Balancing Test
The Second Circuit rejected the Fifth Circuit’s bright-line test,
and instead, in Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co., adopted
185
an “ad-hoc balancing” test.
This test assesses “whether [Rule
23](b)(2) certification is appropriate in light of the relative importance of the remedies sought, given all of the facts and circum186
stances.”
The Second Circuit’s test is more flexible than the Fifth
Circuit’s test and focuses on whether the request for injunctive relief
187
is a sham.
Robinson involved a Title VII class action alleging race discrimination and seeking certification under Rule 23(b)(2), with both dispar188
ate impact claims and pattern-or-practice claims.
Pattern-orpractice claims are usually divided into a liability stage and a remedial
189
stage.
Individual relief, such as backpay or compensatory relief,
sought in addition to class-wide relief, must be ascertained at the re190
medial stage.
The Second Circuit held that the district court, on
remand, should certify the “disparate impact claim for Rule 23(b)(2)
class treatment” and evaluate “whether the pattern-or-practice disparate treatment claim [would be] appropriate” for Rule 23(b)(2) certification, given the standard the Second Circuit set forth in its opin-

185

186
187
188
189
190

Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2001). The Second Circuit describes its ad-hoc balancing in the following manner:
Although the assessment of whether injunctive or declaratory relief predominates
will require an ad hoc balancing that will vary from case to case, before allowing
(b)(2) certification a district court should, at a minimum, satisfy itself of the following: (1) even in the absence of a possible monetary recovery, reasonable plaintiffs would bring the suit to obtain the injunctive or declaratory relief sought; and
(2) the injunctive or declaratory relief sought would be both reasonably necessary
and appropriate were the plaintiffs to succeed on the merits. Insignificant or
sham requests for injunctive relief should not provide cover for (b)(2) certification of claims that are brought essentially for monetary recovery.
Id.
Id. at 164 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id.
Id. at 155.
See id. at 158 (“Generally, a pattern-or-practice suit is divided into two phases: liability and
remedial.” (citation omitted)).
See id. at 159 (“If individual relief such as back pay, front pay, or compensatory recovery is
sought in addition to class-wide injunctive relief, the court must conduct the ‘remedial’
phase.”).
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191

ion.
If the district court found that Rule 23(b)(2) certification of
the pattern-or-practice claim was inappropriate, the Second Circuit
held that the district court should bifurcate the claim, per Rule
23(c)(4), and certify the liability portion of the claim for Rule
192
23(b)(2) class treatment.
In developing and applying the ad-hoc balancing test to the disparate impact claims, the Second Circuit explicitly noted its concern
193
with due process considerations for absent class members. With regard to non-incidental monetary damages in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions, the Second Circuit observed that “due process may require the
enhanced procedural protections of notice and opt out for absent
class members,” and consequently, “certification of a claim for nonincidental [monetary] damages under Rule 23(b)(2) poses a due
process risk because this provision does not expressly afford the pro194
cedural protections of notice and opt out.”
However, the Second
Circuit held that the “due process risk posed by [Rule 23](b)(2) class
certification of a claim for non-incidental [monetary] damages”
could be eliminated by the district court affording notice and opt-out
rights to absent class members in the portions of the proceeding
where non-incidental monetary damages were involved, for example,
195
the damages stage of a disparate impact claim under Title VII.
With regard to the bifurcation of the pattern-or-practice claim, the
Second Circuit observed that “litigating the pattern-or-practice liability phase for the class as a whole” reduces “the range of issues in dis196
pute and promote[s] judicial economy.” Thus, this eliminates the
need for a separate trial with regard to liability during the individual
197
proceedings in the damages phase of the trial. Plaintiffs enter this
191

192

193

194
195
196
197

Id. at 154. There is no subsequent district court opinion, and the case appears to have
been settled. See Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 325 F. Supp. 2d 411, 413
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (allowing parties to reform the settlement agreement).
Robinson, 267 F.3d at 154. Bifurcation of the claim, in this context, means splitting the
liability and damages portions of the claim. For example, the first phase of the litigation
would involve a trial on the issue of whether the defendant had displayed a pattern of discriminatory behavior. If the answer were determined to be yes, then there would be a second phase of the trial to determine damages.
See id. 165 (“[W]e find that an ad hoc approach satisfies the very concerns that have led
other courts to adopt the incidental damages standard—specifically, (1) achieving judicial efficiency, and (2) ensuring due process for absent class members.” (emphasis added)).
Id. at 165–66.
Id. at 166.
Id. at 168.
Id. (explaining that if a Title VII defendant succeeds in the liability stage, then “the question of whether it engaged in a pattern or practice of intentional discrimination that injured its [minority] employees would be completely and finally determined, thereby eliminating entirely the need for a remedial stage inquiry on behalf of each class member”).
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second phase with a presumption “in their favor ‘that any particular
employment decision,’” was made pursuant to the discriminatory pol198
icy. The employer can rebut the presumption by showing that the
199
adverse employment decision was made for lawful reasons.
The Supreme Court did not rule on the permissibility of the Second Circuit’s ad-hoc balancing test in Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes.
While several district courts in the Second Circuit have ruled on the
certification of Rule 23(b)(2) classes following Dukes, the decisions do
not explicitly address whether the Second Circuit’s ad-hoc balancing
test survives. In contrast, the decisions clearly indicate that the Second Circuit does not read Dukes as undermining a court’s ability to
use Rule 23(c)(4) to certify issue classes.
Most courts in the Second Circuit acknowledge that, at a minimum, Dukes has overruled the Robinson ad-hoc balancing test to the
extent that it would allow Rule 23(b)(2) certification in cases where
200
the class seeks monetary relief that is more than incidental.
However, in a case involving sex discrimination claims under Title VII, a
district judge sitting in the Southern District of New York limited the
prohibition of backpay in a Rule 23(b)(2) class only to those instances
201
in which an individualized determination of backpay was necessary.
In the portion of the proceedings where Robinson certified incidental monetary damages under Rule 23(b)(2), Robinson advocated
202
for the use of notice and opt-out rights for absent class members.
On the one hand, the notice and opt-out rights ameliorate, at least to

198
199

200

201

202

Id. at 159 (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 362 (1977)).
See Robinson, 267 F.3d at 159–60 (explaining that, once a class member qualifies for the
liability stage presumption, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the
employment decision was made for lawful reasons) (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 362).
See, e.g., Stinson v. City of New York, No. 10 Civ. 4228, 2012 WL 1450553, at *20 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 23, 2012) (observing that “[b]oth the Second Circuit and this Court have followed
the ‘predominates’ approach the Supreme Court rejected in Dukes”); Chen-Oster v.
Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 6950, 2012 WL 205875, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012)
(concluding that plaintiff’s claims for monetary relief were not incidental and thus could
not be included in a Rule 23(b)(2) class); Easterling v. Conn. Dept. of Corr., 278 F.R.D.
41, 45 (D. Conn. 2011) (observing that “the Supreme Court [in Dukes] rejected the Second Circuit’s broad reading of Rule 23(b)(2)”).
See Cronas v. Willis Grp. Holdings, Ltd., No. 06 Civ. 15295, 2011 WL 5007976, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2011) (“Plaintiffs’ backpay claim does not require additional hearings
to resolve the disparate merits of each individual’s case, and neither introduce[s] new
substantial legal or factual issues, nor entail[s] individualized determinations. . . . In contrast to Wal-Mart, Defendants here have agreed in the Revised Proposed Consent Decree
that the allocation of backpay to class members will be done by formula.” (alteration in
original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
See Robinson, 267 F.3d at 165–66 (“[D]ue process may require the enhanced procedural
protections of notice and opt out for absent class members.”).
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some extent, the due process concerns with certifying monetary damages under Rule 23(b)(2). Courts are authorized under Rule
23(c)(2) to order notice to the class, for classes certified under
203
23(b)(1) or (b)(2). However, there is no general right to opt out
204
for the mandatory classes. On the other hand, the Supreme Court
has stated, in dicta, that it may read Rule 23(b)(2) as inconsistent
205
with monetary damages of any amount. If it were to so hold, then
little would remain of Robinson’s advocacy for notice and opt-out
rights in connection with certification of monetary damages under
Rule 23(b)(2).
Courts in the Second Circuit are open to the idea of certifying two
classes, with one class certified under Rule 23(b)(2) seeking injunctive relief and another certified under Rule 23(b)(3) seeking monetary relief. For example, in a case involving a refusal by Best Buy
Stores to honor its price-match guarantee, a district judge sitting in
the Southern District of New York held that classes certified in a bifurcated manner, with one class seeking injunctive relief certified
under Rule 23(b)(2) and another class seeking monetary relief certi206
fied under Rule 23(b)(3), were not impacted by Dukes. Subsequent
decisions have relied on this decision to certify both a Rule 23(b)(2)
207
injunctive class and a Rule 23(b)(3) monetary relief class. The class

203
204

205

206

207

!

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A).
However, at least one court has ordered plaintiffs to do so, relying on its discretionary
power. See In re Conseco Life Ins. Co. Lifetrend Ins. Sales & Mktg. Litig., Nos. M 10–
02124, C 08–05746, C 10–00652, 2010 WL 5387793, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2010) (observing that the Court ordered “plaintiffs to provide class members with notice of [the]
action and an opportunity to opt out” because of the concurrent regulatory settlement
and leaving that order in place).
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559 (2011) (observing that there is a “serious possibility” that due process would require notice and opt-out rights in any class
seeking monetary relief); see also supra Part I.C.2.
See Jermyn v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 276 F.R.D. 167, 173–74 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (explaining
that the “abrogation of Robinson does not affect certification in this case” because the
(b)(2) class seeks “only an injunction against further statutory violations”). The district
judge did note the necessity of reexamining the issue of Rule 23(b)(2) certification in
light of the fact that “Dukes’ second holding, concerning the effect of claims for monetary
relief on the court’s certification of an injunction class under Rule 23(b)(2) [was] potentially pertinent” because the Second “Circuit had long followed the ‘predominates’ approach rejected in Dukes.” Id. at 173. The district judge also found that the Second Circuit’s earlier decisions allowing certification of an injunction class under Rule 23(b)(2)
and a damages class under Rule 23(b)(3) were not undermined by Dukes. Id. at 169.
See, e.g., Stinson v. City of New York, No. 10 Civ. 4228, 2012 WL 1450553, at *20–21
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2012) (certifying the class under both Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) after
observing that recent precedent in the Southern District “establishes that when a district
court engages in the analysis required under Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3), a class
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certified under Rule 23(b)(3) must satisfy the additional require208
ments imposed on those types of classes.
Further, the portion of the Robinson analysis pertaining to bifurcated claims appears to be in full vigor following Dukes. Shortly after
Dukes, a district judge sitting in the Eastern District of New York held
that “[t]he Second Circuit’s interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4),” which
“has consistently endorsed a broad reading of Rule 23(c)(4)” and its
allowance of certification of issue classes, was “consistent with
209
[Dukes’] interpretation of Rule 23(b).”
Courts in the Second Circuit have followed this reasoning and have read Dukes as not cutting
210
back on the authority granted in Rule 23(c)(4).
Claims brought
under Title VII are well suited to bifurcation, with an initial liability
211
stage certified under Rule 23(b)(2), followed by a remedial stage.

208

209

210

211

!

can be certified seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief as well as money damages”)
(citing Jermyn, 276 F.R.D. at 173).
See Stinson, 2012 WL 1450553 at *21 (noting that, to be certified under Rule 26(b)(3), a
class must also satisfy predominance and superiority requirements); Jermyn, 276 F.R.D. at
173–74 (finding that the class satisfied the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance and superiority
requirements).
United States v. City of New York, 276 F.R.D. 22, 33–34 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that
Dukes did not abolish Robinson insofar as Robinson addresses a court’s ability to certify issue
classes pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4) when only portions of the claim satisfy Rule 23(b)(2)).
See, e.g., Maziarz v. Hous. Auth. of Vernon, 81 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1203, 1214, 1217 (D. Conn.
2012) (commenting that “[w]here a class may be maintained with respect to particular issues, . . . the court is free to certify separate issues, pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4), in order
‘to reduce the range of disputed issues in complex litigation and achieve judicial efficiencies’” and granting motion for class certification pursuant to Rules 23(b)(2) and (b)(3))
(citing Robinson v. Metro–North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 167 (2d Cir. 2001)),
reconsideration denied (Mar. 14, 2012); Easterling v. Conn. Dep’t of Corr., 278 F.R.D. 41, 45
(D. Conn. 2011) (“In Robinson, the Second Circuit exhorted district courts to take full advantage of [Rule 23(c)(4)] to certify separate issues in order to reduce the range of disputed issues in complex litigation and achieve judicial efficiencies.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
See Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 6950, 2012 WL 205875, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012) (observing that “[t]he defendants overstate[d] Dukes’ reach” by
arguing “that as a matter of law, the presence of the plaintiffs’ claims for individualized
relief preclude[] certification of any portion of this case under Rule 23(b)(2)” because
Rule 23(c)(4) allows class actions, when appropriate, to “be brought or maintained . . . with respect to particular issues”) (citation omitted). The court goes on to explain that the question of individual relief in a Title VII case arises only after proof that
an “employer has followed an employment policy of unlawful discrimination,” and that
Title VII claims “therefore can be bifurcated into an initial stage at which the plaintiff
must establish a prima facie case of discrimination and a separate remedial stage.” Id.
Observing that Second Circuit law encourages district courts to “take full advantage of
[Rule 23(c)(4)] to certify separate issues in order to reduce the range of disputed issues
in complex litigation and achieve judicial efficiencies,” the court concludes that
“[d]isparate impact and pattern-or-practice disparate treatment cases are especially appropriate for bifurcation precisely because . . . individual issues arise only if the class established the employer’s liability.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omit-
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As courts in the Second Circuit have observed, Dukes does not address the ability of courts to split proceedings and certify classes under both Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3), or to bifurcate proceedings by
certifying an issue class under Rule 23(c)(4). Thus, at least within
the Second Circuit, these two options remain available to judges considering class certification. Those portions of the Robinson analysis
are unaffected by Dukes.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF WAL-MART V. DUKES’ LIMITATION FOR MONETARY
REMEDIES IN RULE 23(B)(2) CLASSES
Ultimately, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes leaves unanswered the
question of when monetary damages can be included, if ever, under
Rule 23(b)(2). The limitations the Supreme Court placed on monetary remedies under Rule 23(b)(2) can be understood as being motivated by underlying due process concerns, consistent with the historical assumption that courts would determine, on a case-by-case basis,
the due process required for a particular Rule 23(b)(2) class action.
Considering this, what are the best options for structuring a class action that seeks both injunctive and monetary relief, as is typical in Title VII employment discrimination cases? What approaches to structuring class actions can be taken that help address the due process
concerns of both plaintiffs and defendants, but also provide a measure of certainty for the parties by setting clear expectations? The approach taken in the subsequent Dukes litigation offers one example:
the strategy so far has been to split the litigation regionally and separate the classes into an injunction class seeking relief under Rule
23(b)(2) and a damages class seeking relief under Rule 23(b)(3).
Finally, two alternative approaches to address the due process concerns underlying the certification of mandatory classes that involve
monetary damages are briefly explored.
A. Dukes Plaintiffs’ Litigation Strategy Moving Forward: A Case Study
The subsequent litigation in the Dukes case provides a case study
of one approach to the concerns raised by the Supreme Court in

ted). The court found that “the plaintiffs plan to seek class certification pursuant to Rule
23(b)(2) for the liability stage only” was “materially identical to that endorsed by the Second Circuit in Robinson and [thus] would be fully consistent with Dukes’ careful attention
to the distinct procedural protections attending (b)(2) and (b)(3) classes.” Id. at *8 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Dukes. The Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint in the California litigation makes two key changes from the Third Amended Com214
plaint that formed the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision: first,
it brings the action on behalf of a much smaller, regionally-based
class; second, it splits the class in two, with a Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive
215
relief class and a Rule 23(b)(3) monetary relief class.
This strategy appears consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding. The injunctive relief class, consisting of women employed (or
who will be employed) by Wal-Mart in the California Region, seeks
only an injunction to prevent Wal-Mart’s alleged discriminatory employment practices and a declaratory judgment that Wal-Mart’s em216
ployment practices violate Title VII. This is consistent with both the
historical roots of Rule 23(b)(2) classes that the Supreme Court emphasized in Dukes and the Supreme Court’s concern about whether
any monetary relief could ever be certified under Rule 23(b)(2). In
212

213
214
215

216

While subsequent regional actions have been filed in California, Texas, Florida, and
Tennessee, my discussion focuses solely on the California litigation as an illustrative example. See WAL-MART CLASS WEBSITE, http://www.walmartclass.com/public_home.html
(last visited Oct. 20, 2012). On October 15, 2012, the Texas action was dismissed; the district court held that the claims were “barred by the statute of limitations.” See Margaret
Cronin Fisk, Wal-Mart Wins Dismissal of Texas Women’s Class Action, BLOOMBERG NEWS
(Oct.
16,
2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-10-15/wal-mart-winsdismissal-of-texas-women-s-class-action. In late September, the California action survived
Wal-Mart’s
motion
to
dismiss.
See
WAL-MART
CLASS
WEBSITE,
http://www.walmartclass.com/public_home.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).
Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, No. 01-2252 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 26, 2011) [hereinafter Fourth Amended Complaint].
Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, No. 01-2252 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Third Amended Complaint].
Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint seeks to certify two separate classes: an “Injunctive
Relief Class,” consisting of “all women who are currently employed or will be employed at
any Wal-Mart retail store in a California Wal-Mart Region”; and a “Monetary Relief Class,”
consisting of “all women employed at any Wal-Mart retail store in a California Region at
any time from December 26, 1998.” Fourth Amended Complaint at 4. Plaintiffs argue
that the Injunctive Relief Class should be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) and that the
Monetary Relief Class should be certified under Rule 23(b)(3). Id. at 5. Alternatively,
plaintiffs argue for using Rule 23(c)(4). Id. In contrast, Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint sought to certify one class, consisting of “all past, present and future female employees of Wal-Mart’s retail stores . . . in the United States.” Third Amended Complaint
at 4. Plaintiffs argued that the class could be properly certified under either Rule
23(b)(2) or Rule 23(b)(3). Id. Plaintiffs also argued that Rule 23(c)(4)(A) allows certification, as an alternative. Id. The same approach was taken in the Texas regional class actions, with a small change in that the argument for Rule 23(c)(4) issue class certification
was not listed as an alternative, it was simply listed alongside the Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule
23(b)(3) certification arguments. See Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at 7, Odle v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-02954-O (N.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2012)
[hereinafter Texas Complaint].
Fourth Amended Complaint at 29, 32.
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addition, this is consistent with the Second Circuit’s interpretation of
Dukes as applied to splitting injunctive and monetary relief into two
separate classes, with one certified under Rule 23(b)(2) and one under Rule 23(b)(3), or using Rule 23(c)(4) to certify an issue class.
The monetary relief class, consisting of women employed by California-region Wal-Marts during the relevant time period, seeks all
“back pay, front pay, general and specific damages for lost compensation and job benefits” that class members “would have received but
217
for the discriminatory practices” of Wal-Mart. Plaintiffs also request
218
“exemplary and punitive damages” for the monetary relief class.
This too is consistent with the Supreme Court’s limitations on remedies available under the different subdivisions of Rule 23(b); however, the class may still have issues with the additional requirements of
219
Rule 23(b)(3).
When rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s predominance test in Dukes,
the Supreme Court expressed its concern that plaintiffs would add in
claims for equitable relief in order to bypass the stricter requirements
of Rule 23(b)(3). This concern is not implicated here. For one, the
damages class still must meet the stricter requirements in Rule
23(b)(3). These plaintiffs will not be able to rely solely on a determination of liability in the injunction class because of Wal-Mart’s statutory right to an individualized adjudication on the backpay claims;
additional litigation to adjudicate Wal-Mart’s individual defenses will
be necessary. The issues common to both classes can be tried together, without implicating the concern raised by the Supreme Court in
Dukes that plaintiffs would be able to bypass Rule 23(b)(3)’s stricter
requirements.
In addition, this approach addresses the due process concerns
discussed previously. Since all monetary damages would be part of a
Rule 23(b)(3) class, absent class members, for the class seeking monetary relief, would receive notice and have the opportunity to opt out
the litigation. Furthermore, this approach increases the likelihood
217
218

219

Fourth Amended Complaint at 31–32.
Fourth Amended Complaint at 32. The Third Amended Complaint requested all damages noted in the Fourth Amended Complaint, but also requested that class members be
restored to the jobs and wages they would have had, but for Wal-Mart’s discriminatory
practices. Third Amended Complaint at 25. The Fourth Amended Complaint is more
modest in its approach, though still far-reaching, requesting that the injunctive relief include an assessment of job promotion processes and wages and “affirmative action to provide lost promotion opportunities” to the injunctive class members. Fourth Amended
Complaint at 32.
Given this Comment’s focus on Rule 23(b)(2) remedies, I save that analysis for another
Comment.
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that absent class members will be adequately represented, since the
class will not include both former and current employees of WalMart. Thus, the approach taken in the subsequent litigation in the
Dukes case appears to address the underlying due process concerns
that likely motivated the Supreme Court’s limitation on monetary
remedies in Rule 23(b)(2) classes.
However, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision to grant certio220
rari in Comcast v. Behrand, the Northern District of California judge
ordered the parties in Dukes to submit supplemental briefing on the
221
impact of this case on the plaintiffs’ claims in Dukes. At a hearing in
June 2012, Judge Breyer of the Northern District of California reportedly “signaled that plaintiffs could again fall short of showing that
222
they have enough in common to sue the company as a class.” The
primary obstacle plaintiffs face is “to allege class standing that [will]
survive when tested against the language of the high court’s deci223
sion.”
In that regard, Judge Breyer commented that he was “seri224
ously concerned [that] the plaintiff [had] not done so.”
These concerns appear to stem more from the requirements of
Rule 23(a), and less so from Rule 23(b). It is therefore possible that
the approach taken in the subsequent Dukes cases will be found to
adequately address the concerns raised by the Supreme Court. However, the question certified in Comcast raises issues connected with
what evidence must be shown at the certification stage to demonstrate that a case is susceptible to having damages awarded on a classwide basis, and thus, the decision could impact the analysis in Dukes.

220

221

222
223
224

Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, No. 11-864, 2012 WL 113090 (U.S. June 25, 2012) (granting
certiorari on the question of “[w]hether a district court may certify a class action without
resolving whether the plaintiff class has introduced admissible evidence, including expert
testimony, to show that the case is susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide basis”). Behrend involved an antitrust class action brought by customers alleging that Comcast obtained a monopoly and engaged in conduct to exclude competition, seeking certification under Rule 23(b)(3). Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182, 185 (3d Cir.
2011), cert. granted in part, No. 11-864, 2012 WL 113090 (U.S. June 25, 2012).
Cynthia Foster, Judge Asks for More Briefing in Retooled Gender Bias Suit Against Wal-Mart,
THE RECORDER (July 2, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleCA.jsp?id=1202
561703936&Judge_Asks_for_More_Briefing_in_Retooled_Gender_Bias_Suit_Against_Wal
Mart.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. Approaches Addressing Due Process Concerns in Rule 23(b)(2) Classes
That Also Involve Monetary Damages
The approach taken by the plaintiffs in the subsequent Dukes litigation is one way to address the due process concerns entailed in certifying a class seeking monetary relief. However, splitting the claims
between two separate classes certified under Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule
23(b)(3) is not the only solution. From a policy level, what is the best
way to structure a class action, when the class seeks a mix of injunctive
and monetary relief? How can that be done in a manner that balances the competing interests of ensuring that legitimate claims involving both forms of relief can be certified as a class, but also ensuring
that certification does not become a quick way to force the defendant
to settle? The approach taken in Dukes, in the subsequent regional
cases, attempts to find a middle line, which is consistent with how the
Second Circuit views the class action landscape post-Dukes.
In addition to that approach, two other approaches are explored
below. These approaches are offered more as a discussion-starter
than a thorough treatment of the alternative approaches. The first
approach would offer a measure of certainty for both parties by addressing the underlying due process concerns via a rule amendment
to Rule 23. The second approach would offer courts more discretion
and relies solely on the other existing provisions of Rule 23, specifically the Rule 23(c)(4) issue class. Yet another way to approach this
question is to consider the normative policies underlying Rule
23(b)(2) and ask what types of monetary relief, if any, those policies
225
support. For the purpose of the discussion below, this approach is
not developed. In thinking about all of these approaches, it is important to keep in mind that class actions are only one of several devices to facilitate aggregate litigation, and there are other ways to
226
achieve resolution of aggregate claims outside of Rule 23.

225

226

!

This strategy is developed in a recent article. See Neil K. Gehlawat, Note, Monetary Damages and the (b)(2) Class Action: A Closer Look at Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1555
(2012) (concluding “that while it might be problematic for courts to authorize compensatory damages in [Rule 23](b)(2) class actions, courts should be more willing to authorize backpay and punitive damages,” because “[w]hile compensatory damages are more
individualized by nature, punitive damages and backpay are both inherently group remedies” and “are aimed less at compensating individual plaintiffs and more at deterring defendants’ wrongful behavior”). For a more detailed discussion of this approach and the
policy underlying Rule 23(b)(2), see Gehlawat’s article.
For a discussion of some other devices in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that could
be used as an alternative to Rule 23 class actions, see Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1475 (2005) (discussing Federal Rules of Civil
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1. Amendment to Rule 23(b) to Create a Hybrid Class
One option for addressing the due process concerns is simply to
expand the protections afforded absent class members in Rule
23(b)(3). This would make certification much more difficult for
plaintiffs seeking only injunctive or declaratory relief because all absent class members in Rule 23(b)(2) actions would be required to receive notice and have the opportunity to opt out of the litigation.
Class certification would be more difficult because of the additional
time and expense needed to identify and contact all of the absent
class members. Given that many Rule 23(b)(2) classes seek only injunctive or declaratory relief, this additional cost and time may result
in a decrease of valuable claims.
However, an alternative to prohibiting all monetary relief from
classes certified under Rule 23(b)(2) in order to satisfy due process,
or extending the protections afforded absent class members in Rule
23(b)(3) actions to those in Rule 23(b)(2), is to create an intermediate “hybrid” class. This approach would entail amending Rule 23 to
create this new hybrid class. The hybrid class would allow certification of both equitable and monetary relief, but would require notice
and the opportunity to opt out, similar to Rule 23(b)(3). As an intermediary between the existing Rule 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) classes,
this new hybrid would not have a “predominance” test, but the monetary damages would need to meet a strict interpretation of the Fifth
Circuit’s incidental test. Thus, under this new hybrid class, the monetary damages would have to flow directly from the equitable relief to
227
the class as a whole, with no individual determinations necessary.
The benefit of an amendment to Rule 23 is that it would provide
certainty to plaintiffs and defendants. It would allow for careful crafting of a class that recognized the unique position of potential claimants seeking relief under Title VII, or something similar. There are
two large downsides: (1) it would be necessary to craft the hybrid
class in such a way as to prevent claims that normally would be
brought under Rule 23(b)(3) from sneaking into the new hybrid
class because its requirements are less strict; and (2) it would be difficult to draft and approve the hybrid class, given the Supreme Court’s
concerns that using the Ninth Circuit’s predominance test might al-

227

Procedure 20, 22, and 42). In addition, Multi-District Litigation provides yet another alternative. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006).
This approach is similar to the guidance provided in illustration 5 of § 2.04 of Principles
of the Law of Aggregate Litigation. AM. LAW INST., supra note 26, § 2.04 illus. 5 (2010); see
also discussion, supra note 119.
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low classes to add in claims for injunctive relief that predominated
over monetary claims, thereby bypassing Rule 23(b)(3)’s stricter requirements. Further, a rule amendment to this effect would seem to
necessitate a reading of Rule 23(b)(2) to exclude any claims for
monetary relief.
2. Reliance on Rule 23(c)(4) Issue Classes
Another approach is to expand the use of the Rule 23(c)(4) issue
class and to encourage plaintiffs to take greater advantage of this ex228
isting provision. Rule 23(c)(4) provides that “[w]hen appropriate,
an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect
229
Professor Cabraser notes that the issue class
to particular issues.”
has been “infrequently invoked, perhaps due to uncertainty as to how
it is to be ‘construed and applied’” with regard to Rule 23(b)(3)’s
230
predominance analysis. The role of the court with respect to Rule
23(c)(4) issue classes is to separate common issues from individual
ones, certifying common issues for trial, and therefore allowing more
231
efficient resolution of the common issues. The issue class could be
used for cases like Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, allowing resolution of
the common issues related to discrimination claims, while pulling out
claims requiring individual determination for later adjudication. Indeed, both the California and Texas complaints in the subsequent
Dukes litigation include an argument for certification of the common
issues under Rule 23(c)(4) and thus, discretion by the courts as to
232
what due process may be required in this instance.
This approach is, in some ways, more consistent with the underlying due process concerns in Dukes because it leaves the court with
significant discretion in determining when there are common issues
suitable to certification under Rule 23(c)(4). This discretion was the
underlying theme in Professor’s Kaplan’s article discussing the 1966
amendments to Rule 23. However, this approach leaves both plaintiffs and defendants with much uncertainty as to how courts will analyze their particular case, given the discretion allocated to the court.
While it is important that the decisions in the Second Circuit post228

229
230
231
232

The plaintiffs in Dukes relied on this rule in both complaints discussed in this Comment,
as an alternative to certification under 23(b). See Fourth Amended Complaint at 5; Texas
Complaint at 7. The Texas complaint relies on this as a primary claim, instead of relegating it to an alternative claim. Texas Complaint at 7.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4).
Cabraser, supra note 226, at 1499.
Cabraser, supra note 226, at 1501.
Fourth Amended Complaint at 5; Texas Complaint at 7.
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Dukes generally endorse this approach, there is the risk that the Supreme Court will decide that the Rule 23(c)(4) issue class is being
used abusively or too opportunistically, leading it to cut back on this
233
approach.
In addition, there may be some logistical issues to work through.
Even when a particular issue, such as whether an employer had discriminatory promotion policies, can be certified as a Rule 23(c)(4)
issue class, that is only step one. Presumably an employer would still
be entitled to rebut each individual’s presumption of a discriminatory
reason for an adverse employment action. Thus, Rule 23(c)(4) issue
class certification, while allowing for great discretion on the part of
courts consistent with the due process concerns likely underlying
Dukes, would not achieve the efficiencies ideally achieved by class actions. Despite that, creative use of the issue class may be a way to help
address some of the due process concerns underlying the certification of classes involving both equitable and monetary claims.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes left unanswered the question of “whether there are any forms of ‘incidental’
monetary relief that are consistent with the interpretation of Rule
23(b)(2) [that the Supreme Court] . . . announced and that comply
234
with the Due Process Clause.” A close examination of the history of
Rule 23 and the Supreme Court’s class action jurisprudence suggests
that Rule 23(b)(2), as it exists and is applied, does not adequately
protect the due process rights of absent class members when monetary relief is sought in addition to equitable relief. The Supreme
Court’s approach in Dukes, considered in conjunction with Rule 23’s
history and the existing judicial standards for certifying monetary
damages in Rule 23(b)(2) classes, suggests that due process may require notice and opt-out rights for absent class members in actions
seeking monetary damages. But the Court’s lack of a complete prohibition on claims for monetary relief in Rule 23(b)(2) classes is con233

234

Indeed, some read the Supreme Court’s decision in Dukes as signaling that the Court
would narrowly interpret Rule 23(c)(4). See, e.g., James P. Muehlberger & Gregory K.
Wu, Does ‘Wal-Mart’ doom expansive reading of rule authorizing class actions for ‘particular issues’?, THE NAT’L LAW J. (July 11, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/
PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202562602715&Does_WalMart_doom_expansive_reading_of_rule
_authorizing_class_actions_for_particular_issues&slreturn=20120821095750
(positing
that Dukes and other recent cases “signal that the Supreme Court would look with disfavor
upon an expansive interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4)”).
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560 (2011).
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sistent with the 1966 Civil Rules Advisory Committee’s implied assumption that courts had the competence to determine the due process required on a case-by-case basis for Rule 23(b)(2) classes. Thus,
while significant individualized monetary relief cannot be certified in
a Rule 23(b)(2) class after the Court’s decision in Dukes, there may be
other forms of monetary relief that nonetheless could be certified
under Rule 23(b)(2) consistent with the Due Process Clause.
Following the Supreme Court’s decision, the plaintiffs in Dukes
adopted a regional strategy of splitting the litigation into two classes,
one class seeking only injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2), and the
other class seeking monetary relief under Rule 23(b)(3). This approach appears to address the due process concerns likely motivating
the Supreme Court in limiting the availability of monetary damages
under Rule 23(b)(2). In addition, this Comment briefly explored
two alternative approaches: an amendment to Rule 23 to create a
new hybrid class and an expansion of the use of the Rule 23(c)(4) issue class. The first approach offers litigants some certainty in what is
required for certification and how the court will analyze the proposed
class. The second approach is more consistent with the emphasis in
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 on a court having discretion to determine what the Due Process Clause requires in any particular instance; however, it provides very little certainty to litigants.

